Daniel Rutherford v. United States (together with Johnnie Markel Carter v. United States, No. 24-860) (24-820, 24-860)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-11-12
- Decided
- 2026-05-28
- Vote
- 6-3 for United States
- Opinion
- Justice Barrett
- Majority
- Barrett, Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh
- Dissent
- Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson
The case in brief
Facts
Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter were each convicted of more than one federal crime of using a gun during a violent crime, and under the law at the time their mandatory prison terms were "stacked" one after another. That rule gave Rutherford a minimum of 32 years and Carter a minimum of 57 years for those gun crimes. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which ended this stacking rule for first-time offenders but did not apply the change to people who had already been sentenced. Both men asked courts to shorten their sentences under the "compassionate release" law, pointing to the gap between their sentences and what they would receive today. The lower courts refused, ruling that this kind of change in the law cannot count as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason, and the Supreme Court took the cases to settle a disagreement among the federal appeals courts.
Question
Can the gap between an old, longer sentence and the shorter sentence a person would get under a later law that Congress chose not to apply to past cases count as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason to reduce that sentence?
Conclusion
The United States won in a 6-3 decision, with Justice Barrett writing for the Court and the lower court rulings affirmed. The Court held that when Congress chooses not to make a sentencing change apply to past cases, the resulting gap cannot be an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for release, either alone or combined with other reasons, because such non-retroactive changes are normal and treating them as compelling would undercut Congress's choice. The Court also held that the U.S. Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement is invalid to the extent it says otherwise. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, arguing that Congress gave the Commission the power to define these reasons and that its policy was reasonable.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Barrett (12,427 words total).
Volume 608 U. S. Part 2 Pages 454–492
THE SUPREME COURT May 28, 2026
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certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 24–820. Argued November 12, 2025—Decided May 28, 2026* Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a frearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Petitioner Johnnie Carter was convicted of three § 924(c) violations. At the time each was sentenced, a defendant convicted of two § 924(c) counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year sentence for the second offense that would be “stacked” upon (i. e., run consecutively to) the frst offense's mandatory penalty. That sentencing scheme resulted in a 32-year minimum sentence for Rutherford's § 924(c) violations and a 57-year minimum sentence for Carter's violations. Years later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for frst-time offenders. Rutherford and Carter do not qualify for the Act's reduced penalties because the amendment to § 924(c) does not apply to defendants sentenced before the Act. In separate proceedings below, however, Rutherford and Carter each invoked the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) as a basis for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (commonly referred to as the “compassionate release” provision) allows a court to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment if the court fnds, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The courts below held that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduced sentence. The Third Circuit explained in Rutherford's case that the Commission's 2023 amended policy statement—which adds “Unusually Long Sentence” to the list of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that might warrant compassionate release under certain circumstances, see USSG App. C, Amdt. 814—“conficts with the will of Congress” expressed in the statute and thus “cannot be considered in determining a prisoner's eligibility for compassionate release.” 120 F. 4th 360, 376. The Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve the split of Circuit authority over whether the disparity created by a nonret-
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*Together with No. 24–860, Johnnie Markel Carter v. United States, on certiorari to the same court.
Syllabus roactive change to sentencing law is an “extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]” that warrants compassionate release. Held: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to § 924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Pp. 465–473. (a) The plain text of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) empowers a district court to “reduce the term of imprisonment” if it fnds, among other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Under the ordinary meaning of the terms, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons are those that are especially unusual and convincing. The disparity created by Congress's amendment to § 924(c) does not satisfy this definition. Far from “extraordinary,” nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm. Changes to statutory penalties usually beneft only future offenders. When Congress deviates from the default by extending the revised penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, the “ordinary practice” is to “withhol[d] that change from defendants already sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U. S. 260, 280. Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default. As for “compelling”: It is hard to see how Congress's deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could be a convincing reason that warrants a sentence reduction. Congress decided to apply the lower prison sentences to some violators of § 924(c) but not others, “reinforc[ing] its interest in fnality and avoid[ing] burdening district courts with additional litigation.” Hewitt v. United States, 606 U. S. 419, 437–438 (plurality opinion). Treating the disparity resulting from § 924(c)'s amendment as a compelling reason for reducing a sentence would undermine Congress's choice to leave the sentence intact. It would also fall well outside the heartland of compassionate release, which has long been defned by a prisoner's personal circumstances, such as medical condition, age, and family circumstances. Pp. 465–467. (b) Petitioners' arguments to the contrary lack merit. While the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” leave room for judgment, they are not so fexible as to encompass any consideration. Their meaning depends on context: A reason is “extraordinary” and “compelling” only if it is suffciently unusual and convincing to “warrant” compassionate release. The disparity resulting from Congress's amendment to § 924(c) is neither “extraordinary” nor “compelling”—rather it tracks ordinary
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