Isabel Rico v. United States (24-1056)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-11-03
- Decided
- 2026-03-25
- Vote
- 8-1 for Rico
- Opinion
- Justice Gorsuch
- Majority
- Gorsuch, Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
- Dissent
- Alito
The case in brief
Facts
Isabel Rico, who had a federal drug conviction, was serving a term of supervised release (a period of monitored freedom after prison) that was set to end in June 2021. Shortly after leaving prison, she moved without telling her probation officer, and a warrant was issued for her arrest, but federal authorities did not find her until January 2023. While she was missing, she committed a state drug crime in January 2022, and a federal judge treated it as a serious violation of her supervised release and sentenced her to 16 more months in prison. Rico argued the judge could not count that crime because her term had already ended in June 2021, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying her disappearance had paused, or "tolled," the clock. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to settle a disagreement among the federal appeals courts.
Question
Does a person who runs off while on supervised release automatically have their release term extended, so that conduct after the scheduled end date can be treated as a violation?
Conclusion
Rico won in an 8-1 decision written by Justice Gorsuch, which reversed the Ninth Circuit and sent the case back for more proceedings. The Court held that the federal sentencing law does not allow a term of supervised release to be automatically extended when a person absconds, because the law sets detailed, limited rules for extending or pausing a term and leaves out any such rule on purpose. The Court said the government's practical concerns should be taken to Congress, since judges cannot rewrite the law. Justice Alito dissented, arguing the judge could lawfully consider the 2022 drug crime anyway when deciding her sentence.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Gorsuch (6,003 words total).
Volume 607 U. S. Part 2 Pages 609–626
THE SUPREME COURT March 25, 2026
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 24–1056. Argued November 3, 2025—Decided March 25, 2026 A criminal defendant, on supervised release from federal prison, must comply with various conditions—both mandatory (commit no more crimes, see 18 U. S. C. § 3583(d)) and discretionary (commonly, “report to a probation offcer as directed” and “notify the probation offcer promptly of any change in address,” §§ 3563(b)(15), (17)). Violating a prescribed condition may result in the revocation of supervised release and a return to prison, § 3583(e)(3), as well as an additional “term of supervised release after imprisonment,” § 3583(h). After petitioner Isabel Rico violated the terms of her supervised release conditions, the judge revoked her release and ordered her to serve two months of additional imprisonment and a new 42-month term of supervised release set to expire in 2021. When released the second time, Ms. Rico again violated her conditions by changing her residence without notifying her probation offcer. A warrant issued for her arrest, but federal authorities did not locate her until January 2023. As relevant here, during her abscondment, Ms. Rico committed a state law drug offense in January 2022, which resulted in a conviction. Back in federal district court, the judge treated Ms. Rico's drug offense as a Grade A violation of her supervised release conditions and sentenced her to 16 months of incarceration followed by two more years of supervised release. Ms. Rico appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to treat her drug offense as a supervised release violation because that offense occurred after her supervised term expired in June 2021. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, describing Ms. Rico's abscondment as having “tolled” the clock so that her term continued to run until federal authorities caught up with her in 2023. Because of that, the Ninth Circuit held, Ms. Rico's January 2022 drug offense could count as a violation of her federal supervised release. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether abscondment automatically extends a term of supervised release.
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Held: The Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds. Pp. 614–623. (a) What the Ninth Circuit's challenged rule really does is use a defendant's abscondment to extend (not toll) the period of supervised re-
lease beyond what a judge has ordered. Automatically extending a term of supervised release is not among the many tools the Sentencing Reform Act provides courts to address defendants who fail to report or otherwise violate their supervised release conditions. The Act instructs that a term of supervised release starts “the day the person is released from imprisonment,” § 3624(e), and generally sets maximum lengths at one, three, or fve years depending on the severity of the underlying offense, § 3583(b). Neither provision hints at an automatic extension rule, and the Ninth Circuit's rule risks permitting courts to extend supervised release beyond the statutory maximums set by Congress. The Act also authorizes courts to revoke supervised release and impose additional imprisonment and supervised release for violations, but makes no mention of automatic extension for abscondment. Further, an automatic extension rule disregards the limits in the Act's specifc extension and tolling rules. Section 3583(e)(2) generally permits courts to extend supervised release only after holding a hearing and considering various sentencing factors, and not beyond statutory maximums or after the term has expired. Section 3583(i) allows revocation proceedings after a defendant's term of supervised release has expired only for matters arising before expiration and only if a warrant or summons issued during the term. Section 3624(e) provides a true tolling rule, suspending supervised release during imprisonment of 30 consecutive days or more. The cumulative detail of these instructions strongly suggests the absence of anything like the Ninth Circuit's rule is intentional rather than an oversight. Pp. 615–617. (b) The government's arguments fail to support the Ninth Circuit's rule. The government argues because supervision requires “observation and direction,” see, e. g., §§ 3601, 3624(e), 3603(2), (3), and Ms. Rico received neither while absconding, she should receive no “credit” for that period. But the cited provisions merely describe the probation offcer's duties and indicate that supervision occurs only “during the term imposed” by the sentencing court, §§ 3601, 3624(e), which hurts rather than helps the government's cause. Moreover, the government's theory treats Ms. Rico as off and on supervised release at the same time. The government's precedent arguments are also unconvincing. Mont v. United States, 587 U. S. 514, simply recognized that § 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's term during imprisonment for a separate state offense, which highlights the absence of anything like the Ninth Circuit's rule. And United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, rejected an effort to adorn the Act with a rule Congress did not enact, much as the Court does today. The government's common-law argument—that courts historically held an escaped time on the run from prison does not count toward
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