Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, et al. (25-83)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2026-03-30
- Decided
- 2026-05-14
- Vote
- 9-0 for Andre Balazs Properties
- Opinion
- Justice Sotomayor
- Majority
- Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The case in brief
Facts
Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles from 2017 to 2020, and the hotel ended his job in March 2020. He sued the hotel's owners and related parties in federal court in New York, claiming they discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Because Jules had signed an arbitration agreement (a promise to resolve disputes before a private decision-maker instead of a court), the federal court paused, or "stayed," his case while the dispute went to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled against Jules on all claims and ordered him to pay about $34,500 in sanctions, and the respondents then asked the same federal court to confirm the award while Jules asked it to throw the award out, arguing the court lacked power to hear either request. The District Court confirmed the award, the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a disagreement among federal appeals courts.
Question
When a federal court has paused a lawsuit so the claims can go to arbitration, does it have the power to later confirm or cancel the arbitrator's award, even if those requests do not on their own give a federal court a basis to hear them?
Conclusion
The Court ruled 9-0 for Andre Balazs Properties and affirmed the lower court's decision, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor. The Court held that a federal court that pauses a case for arbitration keeps its power to confirm or cancel the resulting award. The core reason was that the court already had jurisdiction over Jules's original federal claims, and nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act took that power away while the parties arbitrated. The Court said its earlier Badgerow v. Walters decision was different because that case involved a request filed on its own, with no earlier lawsuit in federal court.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Sotomayor (6,860 words total).
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1 Pages 200–218
THE SUPREME COURT May 14, 2026
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
JULES v. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 25–83. Argued March 30, 2026—Decided May 14, 2026 This case presents the question whether a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has jurisdiction to confrm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims, even when the motion to confrm under § 9 or the motion to vacate under § 10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face. Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in New York, alleging that respondents unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agreement Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents moved to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration under § 3 of the FAA. The District Court held that the arbitration agreement covered Jules's claims and stayed proceedings. Jules then commenced arbitration against respondents. The arbitrator issued a fnal award, ruling against Jules on all claims and awarding approximately $34,500 in sanctions to respondents. Back in the same District Court that had previously stayed Jules's claims pending arbitration, respondents moved to confrm the award under § 9. Jules opposed confrmation while crossmoving to vacate the arbitral award under § 10 on various grounds. Jules argued that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confrm the award because the § 9 and § 10 motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfed the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and confrmed the arbitral award. The Second Circuit affrmed, reasoning that Badgerow involved a freestanding action commenced for the sole purpose of vacating an arbitral award, but that the present action was distinct because it started as a federal-question suit before it was stayed pending arbitration. The Second Circuit held that a court with the power to stay an action under § 3 has the further power to confrm any ensuing arbitration award, regardless of whether there is an independent jurisdictional basis for the § 9 and § 10 proceedings.
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Held: A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confrm or vacate a resulting
Syllabus arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in § 9 and § 10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court. Pp. 209–218. (a) Unlike with the freestanding applications at issue in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, and Badgerow, assessing jurisdiction over a § 9 or § 10 motion in a case originally fled in federal court does not require “ `looking through' ” the fled action “to the parties' underlying substantive controversy” outside of court. Vaden, 556 U. S., at 62. Instead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is already before it. As Badgerow explained, “[j]urisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and usually “there is no need to `look through' the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.” 596 U. S., at 15. The District Court had original jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, over Jules's federal claims, and it was that very jurisdiction which authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of Jules's claims under the parties' contract before staying litigation pending arbitration pursuant to § 3. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated. When the parties returned to court after arbitration with § 9 and § 10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start. Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 15. This case therefore is not, as petitioner asserts, “Badgerow all over again.” In Badgerow, the frst and only thing that had occurred in federal court was the confrm-or-vacate dispute under § 9 and § 10. In that circumstance, there were only two places a court could look to fnd federal jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions or the underlying dispute that “was not before” the court. Id., at 9. Here, however, there is an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original claims themselves, which were suffcient to establish the District Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. The fact that the arbitral award may have resolved Jules's original claims only underscores why the District Court's original jurisdiction extended to the parties' § 9 and § 10 motions. Those motions required the District Court to assess whether there were grounds to vacate the award. The motions were thus integral to determining whether the award would continue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the court confrmed the award. Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an affrmative defense, a § 9 motion goes further and asks a court to convert an arbitral award into a judgment of the court. That is correct, but federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court
Excerpt of 8 of 67 paragraphs. Full opinion available on the interactive page or in the official PDF.
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