Winston T. Hencely v. Fluor Corporation, et al. (24-924)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-11-03
- Decided
- 2026-04-22
- Vote
- 6-3 for Hencely
- Opinion
- Justice Thomas
- Majority
- Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, Jackson
- Dissent
- Alito, Roberts, Kavanaugh
The case in brief
Facts
Fluor Corporation, a military contractor, hired an Afghan man named Ahmad Nayeb to work at a U.S. base in Afghanistan under the military's "Afghan First" program. Nayeb, a Taliban operative, later set off a suicide bomb at the base that killed 5 people and wounded 17. The Army's investigation found Fluor mainly responsible because it failed to properly supervise Nayeb under base rules. Former Army specialist Winston Hencely, who suffered a fractured skull and brain injuries while stopping Nayeb, sued Fluor for negligence under South Carolina law. The trial court ruled for Fluor, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that in wartime such claims against military contractors arising from combat activities are "preempted," meaning blocked by federal law.
Question
Does federal law block state-law injury lawsuits against a military contractor arising from wartime combat activities, even when the government neither ordered nor authorized the contractor's conduct?
Conclusion
Hencely won in a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thomas, and the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's ruling and sent the case back. The Court held that Hencely's negligence claims are not blocked because the federal government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor's challenged conduct. It reasoned that its earlier precedent protects contractors only when there is a real conflict with a federal interest, such as when the government directed the very conduct being challenged. Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, dissented, arguing that the Constitution's grant of war powers to the federal government blocks this suit.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Thomas (12,139 words total).
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1 Pages 31–66
THE SUPREME COURT April 22, 2026
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
HENCELY v. FLUOR CORP. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 24–924. Argued November 3, 2025—Decided April 22, 2026 Military contractor Fluor Corporation hired Ahmad Nayeb to work at a U. S. base in Afghanistan as part of the “Afghan First” initiative, a military program that required contractors to hire Afghans to help stimulate the local economy and stabilize the Afghan Government. Nayeb, a Taliban operative, later carried out a suicide-bomb attack at the base that killed 5 and wounded 17. The Army's investigation found Fluor primarily responsible for the attack because it negligently supervised Nayeb in complying with base procedures. Former Army specialist Winston T. Hencely, who suffered a fractured skull and brain injuries in the course of stopping Nayeb before he could reach a larger crowd, sued Fluor in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina seeking damages under South Carolina law for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention of Nayeb. The District Court entered summary judgment for Fluor, and the Fourth Circuit affrmed. It held that during wartime, state-law claims against military contractors under military command arising out of combatant activities are preempted. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception, which preserves the Federal Government's immunity against claims “arising out of the combatant activities of the military” during wartime, 28 U. S. C. § 2680( j), also refects a congressional intent to bar tort suits against contractors connected with those combatant activities, even when the contractor is alleged to have violated its instructions from the military.
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Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in fnding Hencely's state-law tort claims preempted where the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor's challenged conduct. Pp. 37–48. (a) Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly preempts Hencely's suit. The Supremacy Clause requires state law to yield only when it conficts with rights or restrictions that stem from the Constitution or a valid federal statute or treaty. Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U. S. 191, 202. Here, no constitutional provision or federal statute expressly preempts Hencely's suit. And the Court has already held that the FTCA's combatant-activities exception does not itself apply to
suits against federal contractors. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807, 813–814. Pp. 37–48. (b) Lacking any constitutional or statutory text supporting preemption, the Fourth Circuit relied on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500. Boyle does not support the Fourth Circuit's preemption rule. Boyle involved a procurement contract, not a performance contract like the one here, and it did not involve the FTCA's combatantactivities exception. More importantly, Boyle recognized displacement of state law only when there is a “signifcant confict” between state law and “an identifable federal policy or interest.” Id., at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted). Boyle accordingly protects a contractor only when the Government directed the contractor to do the very thing challenged in the suit. Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74, n. 6. Hencely, by contrast, sued Fluor for conduct that was not authorized by the military and was allegedly contrary to federal instructions. Boyle's reasoning thus contradicts the Fourth Circuit's analysis. Even assuming a “uniquely federal interest” in regulating military bases overseas, no “signifcant confict” exists between that interest and state-law negligence liability based on a contractor's departure from military instructions. Boyle, 487 U. S., at 507. Pp. 38–43. (c) The Fourth Circuit's preemption test sweeps too broadly. The FTCA's combatant-activities exception protects the Government's own combat-related decisions. Any comparable federal interest would therefore preempt state law only where the challenged conduct can fairly be treated as the military's own conduct or decision. But the Fourth Circuit expressly concluded that resolving Hencely's claims would not require evaluating the reasonableness of military judgments, and it nonetheless found preemption simply because the suit arose in a wartime combat setting. Boyle's rationale justifes no such blanket preemption. Pp. 43-45. (d) Nor does the Constitution's structure implicitly bar this suit. Although the Constitution gives Congress and the President broad war powers, that assignment has never been understood to bar all warrelated tort suits. And federal contractors do not automatically share the Government's immunity merely because they perform services for it. Absent a statute to the contrary, States can regulate or tax federal contractors on the same terms as any private company. See, e. g., James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94, 104. Fluor does not attempt to, and could not, invoke a defense under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18. The Yearsley doctrine shields a contractor only when it is being sued precisely for accomplishing what the Federal Government requested. Because Fluor is alleged to have acted outside the authority the military granted it, Yearsley does not apply. Pp. 45–48.
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