Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. v. United States (24-482)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-10-14
- Decided
- 2026-01-20
- Vote
- 9-0 for Ellingburg
- Opinion
- Justice Kavanaugh
- Majority
- Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The case in brief
Facts
A 1996 federal law, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), requires people convicted of certain federal crimes to pay money, called restitution, to their victims. Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. committed his crime before this law was passed, but he was sentenced under it later in 1996 and ordered to pay $7,567.25. He argued that his continuing duty to pay violates the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, which bars laws that add punishment for conduct that happened before the law existed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against him, holding that MVRA restitution is not criminal punishment, so the Clause does not apply. In the Supreme Court, Ellingburg and the government both agreed that ruling was wrong, so the Court appointed an outside lawyer, John F. Bash, to defend it.
Question
Is restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act a form of criminal punishment, so that the Ex Post Facto Clause's ban on retroactive punishment applies to it?
Conclusion
Ellingburg won in a unanimous 9-0 decision written by Justice Kavanaugh, which reversed the Eighth Circuit and sent the case back. The Court held that MVRA restitution is plainly criminal punishment because the law calls it a penalty for a crime and imposes it only on convicted defendants at sentencing, alongside prison and fines. The Court accepted that the law also aims to compensate victims, but said this shows only that Congress meant restitution both to punish and to compensate. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, agreed but wrote separately to urge the Court to return to an older approach that would cover any coercive penalty for a public wrong, whatever its label.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Kavanaugh (8,029 words total).
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 163–186
THE SUPREME COURT January 20, 2026
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A NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 24–482. Argued October 14, 2025—Decided January 20, 2026 The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 requires defendants convicted of certain federal crimes to pay monetary restitution to victims. Although petitioner Ellingburg committed his crime before the MVRA's enactment, he was sentenced under the MVRA and ordered to pay $7,567.25 in restitution. Ellingburg raised an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to his continued restitution obligation. The Eighth Circuit concluded that restitution under the MVRA is not criminal punishment subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Held: Restitution under the MVRA is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whether a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause requires evaluating whether the law imposes a criminal or penal sanction as opposed to a civil remedy. That question is one “of statutory construction” that requires the Court to “consider the statute's text and its structure.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U. S. 84, 92 (quotation marks omitted). When viewed as a whole, the MVRA makes abundantly clear that restitution is criminal punishment. The MVRA labels restitution as a “penalty” for a criminal “offense. ” 18 U. S. C. § 3663A(a)(1). Only a criminal defendant convicted of a qualifying crime may be ordered to pay restitution. Restitution is imposed at sentencing for that offense together with other criminal punishments such as imprisonment and fnes. And at the sentencing proceeding where restitution is imposed, the Government, not the victim, is the party adverse to the defendant. Further, the federal MVRA restitution regime is codifed in Title 18, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,” and the statutory provisions authorizing restitution orders are contained in Chapter 232 of that Title, entitled “Miscellaneous Sentencing Provisions.” A district court imposing restitution must follow the procedures applicable to other criminal penalties. The Court's precedents have understood restitution under the MVRA to be criminal punishment. See Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. 116, 118. And the Court's precedents on related issues further buttress the conclusion that MVRA restitution is criminal punishment. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 328; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 363–366.
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Opinion of the Court
Finally, while Congress intended restitution under the MVRA to both punish offenders and compensate victims, victims cannot initiate or settle the restitution process as they would if it were a civil proceeding. The text and structure of the Act demonstrate that Congress intended restitution under the Act to impose criminal punishment. Pp. 165–169. 113 F. 4th 839, reversed and remanded. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 169.
Excerpt of 8 of 88 paragraphs. Full opinion available on the interactive page or in the official PDF.
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