Michael S. Bowe v. United States (24-5438)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-10-14
- Decided
- 2026-01-09
- Vote
- 5-4 for Bowe
- Opinion
- Justice Sotomayor
- Majority
- Sotomayor, Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Jackson
- Dissent
- Gorsuch, Thomas, Alito, Barrett
The case in brief
Facts
Michael Bowe is a federal prisoner serving a 24-year sentence after pleading guilty in 2008 to two robbery crimes and a gun crime tied to a "crime of violence." Ten years of that sentence came from the gun conviction, and later Supreme Court decisions suggest that conviction may no longer hold up. Federal law requires a prisoner who wants to bring a second or later challenge to first get permission from a federal appeals court. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly turned Bowe down, partly by relying on a rule that requires dismissal of claims a prisoner has already raised before. Bowe asked the Supreme Court to step in, pointing out that appeals courts disagree on whether that rule applies to federal prisoners, and the Court agreed to hear the case.
Question
Does federal law stop the Supreme Court from reviewing an appeals court's decision on a federal prisoner's request to file a second challenge, and does the rule requiring dismissal of repeated claims apply to federal prisoners?
Conclusion
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court ruled for Bowe, set aside the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and sent the case back. The Court held it could hear the case because the law barring Supreme Court review does not clearly cover federal prisoners, and Congress must speak clearly to take away the Court's power to hear cases. It also held that the rule requiring dismissal of repeated claims, by its own words, applies only to state prisoners. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion, and Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, with Justice Barrett joining part of it.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Sotomayor (19,938 words total).
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 13–70
THE SUPREME COURT January 9, 2026
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A NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 24–5438. Argued October 14, 2025—Decided January 9, 2026 Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year sentence in federal custody after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; and (3) using a frearm in relation to a “crime of violence” as defned in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Bowe's § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for the robbery offenses. To have been properly convicted under § 924(c), at least one of Bowe's other offenses must qualify as a “crime of violence” under one of two defnitional clauses in § 924(c): the “elements clause,” § 924(c)(3)(A), or the “residual clause,” § 924(c)(3)(B). But decisions issued years after Bowe's conviction call into question whether either clause can support his § 924(c) conviction. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470 (residual clause void for vagueness); United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 860 (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements clause). This case concerns Bowe's efforts to obtain postconviction relief from the mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence imposed under § 924(c). A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (state prisoners); § 2255 (federal prisoners). Particularly relevant here, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or subsequent efforts at obtaining postconviction relief require the prisoner frst to seek certifcation from a court of appeals that the fling meets threshold conditions before a prisoner can proceed in a district court. See § 2244 (authorization requests by state prisoners); § 2255(h) (successive-motion requests by federal prisoners). While §§ 2244 and 2255(h) have distinct requirements, § 2255(h) crossreferences some of the procedures in § 2244 for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certife[s]” a second or successive fling. Bowe frst sought § 2255 relief in 2016, arguing that § 924(c)'s residual clause was unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that—regardless of the residual clause's constitutionality— Bowe's § 924(c) conviction was proper because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifed as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. In 2019, after Davis, Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit
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Syllabus under § 2255(h) to fle a second or successive motion. A three-judge panel found that Bowe had not met § 2255(h)'s threshold conditions. Although the panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retroactive constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for successive motions under § 2255(h)(2)), it held that Bowe could not make a prima facie showing that his § 924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because then-binding Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. After Taylor was decided in 2022, Bowe once again sought authorization under § 2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor leave none of his convictions as a valid predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c). A panel dismissed the part of Bowe's request resting on Davis, reasoning that the claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under § 2244(b)(1). The panel also denied the part of Bowe's request that rested on Taylor, concluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit several times, seeking authorization to pursue postconviction relief, initial hearing en banc, and reversal of Circuit precedent applying § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar to federal prisoners' successive § 2255 motions. He also requested certifcation of the question whether § 2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. See § 1254(2). Bowe's requests were denied. Bowe eventually fled this petition for certiorari, pointing out a Circuit split: Six Circuits apply § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar to federal prisoners, while three do not. The Court granted review.
Page Proof Pending Publication Held: 1. The Court has jurisdiction because § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court's review of a federal prisoner's request to fle a second or successive § 2255 motion. Pp. 22–36. (a) Section 2244(b)(3)(E) provides that the denial of authorization “to fle a second or successive application” shall not be the subject of a certiorari petition. That provision does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed within § 2244, which imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners. It also speaks only to a “second or successive application,” § 2244(b)(3)(E), but unlike state prisoners who fle such “applications,” federal prisoners fle “motions,” see § 2255(e). Pp. 22–24. (b) The Government contends that § 2255(h)'s cross-reference to § 2244—providing that a successive motion must be “certifed as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” the content requirements in § 2255(h)—also imports § 2244's certiorari bar. But § 2255(h)'s cross-reference, coupled with its context,
Excerpt of 8 of 194 paragraphs. Full opinion available on the interactive page or in the official PDF.
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