Dwayne Barrett v. United States (24-5774)
- Term
- OT 2025
- Argued
- 2025-10-07
- Decided
- 2026-01-14
- Vote
- 9-0 for Barrett
- Opinion
- Justice Jackson
- Majority
- Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The case in brief
Facts
Dwayne Barrett took part in a series of robberies in 2011 and 2012, and during one of them his partner shot and killed a man named Gamar Dafalla. For that robbery, Barrett was convicted under two related federal gun laws: one for using a gun during a violent crime, §924(c)(1)(A)(i), and one for causing a death during that crime, §924(j). After the Supreme Court decided an earlier case on these laws, the Second Circuit appeals court ordered the trial court to give Barrett separate convictions and sentences under both laws. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because federal appeals courts had split on this issue. The federal government agreed with Barrett, so the Court appointed a lawyer, Charles L. McCloud, to defend the lower court's ruling.
Question
When one act breaks both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j), can it lead to two separate convictions, one under each law, or only one?
Conclusion
Barrett won in a unanimous 9-0 decision, with Justice Jackson writing the Court's opinion. The Court held that one act breaking both laws can lead to only one conviction, because the two laws define the same crime and Congress did not clearly approve two convictions for it. The Court noted that when Congress wants to stack punishments, it uses words like "in addition to," and it used no such words here. Justice Gorsuch joined most of the opinion but wrote separately to say that the Constitution's ban on being punished twice for the same offense (the Double Jeopardy Clause) may itself forbid two convictions, no matter what Congress intends.
Opinion of the Court
Authored by Justice Jackson (9,118 words total).
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 128–154
THE SUPREME COURT January 14, 2026
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certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 24–5774. Argued October 7, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026 This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 924: subsection (c)(1)(A)(i), which criminalizes using, carrying, or possessing a frearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug traffcking crime, and subsection ( j), which prescribes different penalties—including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment—when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death. The question presented is whether a single act that violates both provisions may yield two convictions—one under each provision—or only one. The Second Circuit held that one such act may yield two convictions. The Second Circuit acknowledged that subsection (c)(1) and subsection ( j) qualify as the same offense under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299. But it believed that, as construed in Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453, the two provisions are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments. Because the Second Circuit's decision deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, this Court granted certiorari.
Page Proof Pending Publication Held: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and ( j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. The part of the Second Circuit's judgment that held otherwise is reversed. Pp. 135–148. (a) When enacted, § 924(c) “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry a frearm in connection with a predicate federal crime of violence or drug traffcking crime. Abbott v. United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12. A § 924(c) violation triggers a mandatory minimum sentence of at least fve years. Congress later added § 924( j) to provide a different penalty scheme for § 924(c) violations that cause death. Section 924( j) has no mandatory minimums; it instead authorized signifcant maximum sentences, including the death penalty or life in prison when the underlying violation is murder. Pp. 135–138. (b) The question in this case is whether subsection ( j) also increased the number of convictions (rather than just the maximum sentence) that can result from a fatal violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court resolves the question as a matter “of statutory construction,” because “whether punishments . . . are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved with-
Syllabus out determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 688. And the Court undertakes this exercise in statutory construction with a thumb on the scale in the form of the Blockburger presumption, which instructs that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. It is undisputed that § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924( j) defne the same offense per Blockburger. But the Court has said that the Blockburger presumption can yield to a plainly expressed contrary intent. This case therefore turns on whether Congress plainly expressed an intent to overcome the Blockburger presumption by authorizing multiple convictions for one act that violates both § 924(c) (1)(A)(i) and § 924( j). To ascertain such intent, the Court turns to statutory text, structure, and (for those who accept its help) legislative history. Pp. 138–140. (c) The text of § 924 suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively, that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Congress included Blockburger-surmounting language twice within subsection (c) itself: It mandated that a § 924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate, and it also mandated that a conviction under § 924(c)(5)—for using or carrying armor piercing ammunition— must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction under” § 924. The Court has elsewhere called such “in addition to” language “crystal clear” evidence of a legislature's intent to overcome Blockburger. But Congress used no similar language with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection ( j). Pp. 140–144. (1) The argument that subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate textually authorizes dual convictions misunderstands the inquiry. Blockburger addresses the permissibility of multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences; the assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes, where punishment means a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence. Accordingly, § 924(c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate simply speaks past the question in this case: whether one act may result in two convictions. Before the consecutive-sentence mandate gains any relevance, a court must frst determine whether two punishments (convictions) may be imposed at all. Only if two convictions may coexist does a court consult the consecutive-sentence mandate to arrange properly the resulting sentences. Pp. 141–143. (2) The argument that subsection (c)(1) and subsection ( j) have different focuses and thus target different wrongs that may be punished cumulatively is equally unavailing. The conduct (or result) that differ-
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