Shaw v. United States

Oral argument transcript · No. 15-5991 · October Term 2016 · argued October 4, 2016 · the petitioner won

Decision: votes, opinion and citations · Official transcript (PDF) · Argument audio at the Supreme Court

Advocates

• Koren L. Bell, Los Angeles, Cal., for the petitioner
• Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, appearance

Transcript

From the Court's official transcript; speaker labels as in the transcript, with advocates' full names from its list of appearances.

Chief Justice Roberts: We'll hear argument next in Case 15991, Shaw v. United States. Ms. Bell. ORAL ARGUMENT OF KOREN L. BELL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Koren L. Bell: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Clause (1) of the Federal Bank Fraud Statute premises culpability on intent to defraud a financial institution, and this case concerns what that element entails. The settled meaning of clause (1)'s text based on a century of this Court's precedent, its fraud precedent, makes clear that intent to defraud a bank requires intent both to deceive the bank and wrong the bank in its own property rights. Intent to wrong a bank's property rights, which includes its own possessory rights, in bank-held property means intent to cause the bank, not the customer, to bear the proper loss of a fraud scheme. And in this sense --

Justice Sotomayor: I'm sorry. Possessory right means I own something. I'm holding it. In most criminal charges for larceny, the issue is whether I have a possessory right, regardless of what I want to do Alderson Reporting Company 1 with this property, over you who's taken it from me. So where do you get the next step that possessory right means I have to lose something of value or that I'm going to ultimately bear the loss? Isn't the loss merely the loss of the possessory right?

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, the statute turns on intent, and were the government to prove the defendant's intent to deprive of you of your possessory right, and that would be sufficient. And where that comes from is from this Court's settled fraud precedent. Going back a hundred years, the Court has interpreted the term "defraud" to mean property lost to the victim. And we see that --

Justice Breyer: So if you're insured and the -- or at least the defendant believes he's insured, it isn't theft?

Koren L. Bell: If the defendant believes that the bank is insured and therefore that another party will bear the loss?

Justice Breyer: Even Kardashian's thief, if there is one, believes that all that jewelry is insured. Indeed over insured. So it's not theft?

Koren L. Bell: Well, so it would depend on the language of the statute.

Justice Breyer: No, it says defraud. She Alderson Reporting Company 1 lied. He says I'm knocking on the door -- you know, I'll go as far as you want. But I don't see that that has anything to do with it. You mean if he -- if he defrauds him out of the money, he defrauds her out of the jewelry, says here I a.m., your local jewelry cleaner. Gets the jewelry. Wouldn't you think that was fraud? Even if she's insured. Even if he thinks she's triple insured. Even if he thinks that, in fact, this isn't even her jewelry, that it was just loaned her on the occasion by a good friend, the necklace.

Koren L. Bell: It would depend on whether the statute in that case required the intent to defraud --

Justice Breyer: What the statute says is defraud.

Koren L. Bell: Defraud. In that case it's much like the mail and wire fraud statutes which do not specify a required victim for the fraud scheme, and therefore provided the government could prove the two undisputed components of the term "defraud" which come from --

Justice Breyer: I'm not asking you to repeat it. I'm asking you, if the local person comes to the door and says, dear Miss Kardashian, I a.m. your local jewelry cleaner. Please give me your jewelry. She does. And that's not fraud. He wanted to get the Alderson Reporting Company 1 jewelry. He tried to get the -- he also believed that the friend had just loaned it for the evening, that she's triple insured, that she won't even lose any money because the publicity will be worth it. Okay?

Koren L. Bell: Right. And that --

Justice Breyer: Now, my question is: There's the statute. I would have always thought from first year of law school, criminal law, that that was fraud, but perhaps I was wrong. So I would like you to explain it.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. That would be a scheme to defraud the insurer. If the scheme -- if the -- and in this case of the mail and wire fraud statutes which penalize a scheme to defraud anyone, for example, and provide heightened penalties for schemes that defraud anyone and happen to affect the bank, then, yes, that would -- would satisfy the statute. But if the statute specified a particular victim as clause (1) does here, and clause (1) says the intended victim must be the bank, not the customer. And so our argument depends on that -- on -- on two steps based on this Court's long-standing fraud precedent. The first is how we define defraud. But the second is the presence of the direct object there. In the example that Your Honor posited, there -- there was Alderson Reporting Company 1 no required object of the fraud scheme, and therefore at the very least it would certainly constitute a scheme to obtain money or property by means of false pretenses.

Chief Justice Roberts: You get -- you get mired in some very abstract concepts of property rights. Yes, someone is insured, but here if they keep getting their property stolen, their insurance rates go up. Here, okay, it wasn't that if you -- correct, it wasn't the bank's own property, but it's somebody else's property that they use in making loans. And, again, they will have less money to make loans if the property is -- is being taken. Now, does your case turn on what the defendant knows even if that's not right? I mean, the argument may as well -- people commonly think you put your money in the bank, it's your money, and they'll give it back, but of course it's loaned out by the bank. But if the defendant really thinks I'm not -- I don't want to take anything from the bank. I'm taking this from two -- and he's wrong, is -- is he off the hook?

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. So first of all, the standard here is not what he knows but what he intends, which this Court, going back to the Durland case in 1896, has equated with purpose, which makes sense because we're talking about a scheme which is a plan Alderson Reporting Company 1 with a purpose. And precisely for that reason this particular liability scheme avoids the effect-based technicalities that the government complains of, because it doesn't matter whether the bank in fact has possessory interest or whether the insurer is going to in fact bear the loss. The only thing that matters is as Your Honor says what the defendant intends, what his purpose is in devising this scheme.

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, is that making -- is that ignorance of the law being the defense because the law -- he thinks the bank -- the bank doesn't have any property interest at all, but in fact the bank has the property interest as either a bailee or bailor or -- I forget which one it is -- and the bank has the property interest because it actually uses the money in its own effect, but he's wrong about that legal question of property. So his ignorance of the law is a defense?

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, it wouldn't be ignorance of the law. This -- there's nothing anomalous about an intent-based liability scheme. And the answer is that particular fraud scheme would be punished under clause (2) of this statute. It's not that it's not bank fraud --

Justice Ginsburg: You mentioned the sub 2. Alderson Reporting Company 1 Do you recognize, do you concede that Shaw could have been charged and convicted under the obtaining property owned by or under the custody or control of a financial institution if the -- if the government had charged that instead of defrauding a financial institution, could Shaw have been found guilty?

Koren L. Bell: Absolutely, Your Honor. That was the appropriate charge in this case. And the reason why the bank fraud statute works as a whole exactly as Congress intended based on this intent-based liability scheme is because the schemes that arise in the federal circuits sort neatly into clause (1), clause (2), or both depending on the design of the scheme. So the design is in most every practical case in every real-world example going to reflect the intent.

Justice Kennedy: Well, design here, the intent here is to harm whoever has a lawful possessory interest.

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, the intent required under clause (1) -- and that's quite clear because it specifies the bank -- is to harm the bank in its property right.

Justice Kennedy: But it has a possessory interest --

Koren L. Bell: And -- and certainty if the -- Alderson Reporting Company

Justice Kennedy: And that possessory interest is harmed. It's the harm to the interest, not the harm to the entity.

Koren L. Bell: It -- it -- in fact it may be harmed, although in this case, of course this is an example where the banks never suffered any loss, and there was no dispute on that point. But certainly, Your Honor, it's true that the --

Justice Kennedy: But it was -- was it not a harm to the possessory interest?

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. Insofar as the bank was deprived for a momentary period of those funds in its coffers, yes, in fact it was deprived.

Justice Kagan: So, Ms. Bell, I guess -- I guess what Justice Kennedy is suggesting and maybe I'm confused about the same thing, it now seems to me that there's no difference between your view and the government's view. So, Mr. Yang, I'm putting you on notice that this is a question to you too, because both of you are saying, look, there needs to be an intent to deceive the bank.

Koren L. Bell: Correct.

Justice Kagan: And there needs to be an intent to deprive the bank of some form of property Alderson Reporting Company 1 interest, but with the recognition that property interests includes possessory interests, as well as more classic ownership interests. And you agree with that.

Koren L. Bell: Correct, Your Honor.

Justice Kagan: I'm going to think, and Mr. Yang you'll tell me, that Mr. Yang would agree with that too. So what are we fighting about?

Koren L. Bell: Correct, Your Honor.

Justice Kagan: Then it's just -- Mr. Yang would say, well, look, a bank has a possessory interest in assets that are part of its depositor's account, and so, you know, that's -- whether you target the depositor's account or you target something else, you're still manifesting the same intent to deprive the bank of a property including possessory interest.

Koren L. Bell: Right. I understand, Your Honor. I think there are two issues here. The first one is whether an intent to deceive is sufficient for an intent to defraud. And the Ninth Circuit approved of jury instructions that permitted a conviction on that basis. That alone --

Justice Kagan: That seems right to me. I want to point, you know, that you might say all of that is right and that the government and you agree, and what you really disagree on is whether these instructions Alderson Reporting Company 1 reflected that correct understanding of the law. And that seems fair to me. And we should talk about the instructions.

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Kagan: But it seems to me that the understanding of the law is now you are in perfect harmony.

Koren L. Bell: It -- it -- it may be the case, but let me explain. I think that on the -- the second prong, in terms of if intent to deceive requires more -- I'm sorry -- if intent to defraud requires more than just intend to deceive, what is that second piece? And there we get to what it means to wrong a bank and its property rights.

Justice Breyer: What it says in the instructions is, "Intent to deceive, cheat, or deprive a financial institution of something of value."

Koren L. Bell: Correct, Your Honor. And that would --

Justice Breyer: So what's the problem?

Koren L. Bell: That would -- because it's worded in a disjunctive, in other words, or, it permits a conviction on the basis --

Justice Breyer: So the "or" goes between "to deceive, cheat, or deprive." Alderson Reporting Company

Koren L. Bell: Correct. And so it was --

Justice Breyer: But what you have to cheat, deceive, or deprive them of, is something of value.

Koren L. Bell: Correct, Your Honor --

Justice Breyer: And a possessory interest is something of value. So what are you arguing about?

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, two things. First of all, the -- I would disagree, respectfully, with the Court's interpretation of -- of the scheme to defraud instruction. I do not think that the "deprive the bank of something of value" is plausibly read to modify "deceive" and "cheat."

Justice Breyer: In other words, you think it means "deceive, cheat, or deprive"?

Koren L. Bell: Correct, your Honor.

Justice Breyer: But not of anything. It doesn't say anything, what it seeks to deprive them of. And then it comes out of the blue and says --

Justice Kagan: I think it --

Justice Breyer: -- someone intends a financial institution of value. That's what you think it means.

Justice Kagan: But it --

Justice Breyer: Okay. Did you make that Alderson Reporting Company 1 argument in the court below?

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. That was precisely the argument --

Justice Breyer: What page? Do you have it here, by chance, what page you made that particular argument?

Koren L. Bell: Sure, Your Honor. I get that on rebuttal. I don't want to take the Court's time now, but let -- let me be clear: Here -- we're here because the -- the scheme to defraud requires the intent to defraud, and that -- that's really undisputed that that's the element. The intent to defraud instruction simply required the intent to deceive or cheat.

Justice Sotomayor: My colleague Justice Alito has written extensively on this issue of intent versus knowledge.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Sotomayor: All right. Why don't we just, instead of using intent --

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: All right. You can deceive someone without taking property, right?

Koren L. Bell: Certainly. Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: All right. Someone can Alderson Reporting Company 1 open up an account in a false name. They've deceived the bank, but it's not to cheat the bank of anything its holding. But it's to the cheat the wife who he wants to hide money from, right?

Koren L. Bell: Okay. Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: So nothing of value has been taken. You can cheat the bank in that way, too, out of moving something somewhere, but not to take it. Okay?

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: And you can deprive someone of property without deceiving or cheating them. You can rob them, right?

Koren L. Bell: Correct.

Justice Sotomayor: All right. So I thought -- and this is what Justice Kagan was getting to -- it has to be that you deceive or cheat and deprive someone of property, correct?

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, the cheat, I think, is synonymous with the concept of --

Justice Sotomayor: Of defrauding.

Koren L. Bell: -- of -- of -- well, defrauding. Your Honor is correct.

Justice Sotomayor: You -- you defraud someone by deception. Alderson Reporting Company

Koren L. Bell: Deception in order to cause them to bear the property loss --

Justice Sotomayor: That's why you say it's two different elements.

Koren L. Bell: They're two -- no. I'm sorry. They're not two different elements. It's one element. It's the intent to defraud. But there are two components of defraud, and the government doesn't dispute that. That comes from the Hammerschmidt case in --

Justice Sotomayor: So far, I perfectly understand your point.

Koren L. Bell: Thank you. Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: That the defraud element has two prongs to it; deception, for the lack of -- deception is one prong and deprivation is the other. You're taking the money by -- or the possessory interest by deception. And you're saying that by using the disjunctive, the "or," the jury could have convicted merely for deceiving the bank, but didn't find that they deceived "and" deprived the bank of a possessory interest, correct?

Koren L. Bell: That's exactly right, Your Honor. That's exactly right. Alderson Reporting Company

Justice Sotomayor: Now, Justice Breyer has asked the operative question.

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: And -- and it's what confused me throughout, both in the discussions below and here. At first, I thought this case was only about reading your brief about whether the deprivation had to be of something the bank owned.

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: As opposed to had a possessory interest in. And Justice Kagan rightly says you seem to have backed off from that claim. You seem to be saying "owned" can mean merely a possessory interest. Is that correct, now?

Koren L. Bell: Your Honor, we don't see that as a different formulation, and let me explain why, 'cause I certainly understand the confusion. The -- the standard is that comes from this Court's fraud precedent, the mail and wire fraud precedent that everybody agrees is the operative body of law is the intent to wrong the bank in its property rights. That's --

Justice Kennedy: In its what?

Koren L. Bell: In its property rights. In its Alderson Reporting Company 1 property rights. In its own property rights.

Justice Kagan: Which you -- which you now include can include possessory interests.

Koren L. Bell: Correctly. And we certainly never meant to -- to disavow that. The issue is what does that mean in practice? And in practice what that means is the intent to cause the bank, and not the customer, to -- to bear the property loss of the scheme.

Justice Alito: No. That's not what it means.

Justice Kagan: No.

Justice Alito: That's not what it means. And maybe something more is required. Maybe it has to be deprive of an ownership interest or cause a loss, but depriving of a possessory interest is not the same as causing a loss to the bank.

Koren L. Bell: Well, let me explain how I mean it. I mean it in the sense that, as this Court has recognized, when you intend a deprivation of a victim, you -- you also -- the mirror image of that is the intended acquisition. And that's where we're getting the idea that when you intend -- if a defendant were -- and I have never seen a case in my personal practice, or anywhere in the Federal circuits, that approaches anything like an intent to actually deprive the bank of Alderson Reporting Company 1 its possessory interest. What defendants think about when they posit these schemes to get customer deposits is to either -- is either that they are taking the customer's money, or they are taking the bank's money, insofar as the bank is going to suffer the loss, or the customer is going to suffer the loss.

Justice Kagan: Most of them don't care.

Justice Kennedy: You want us to write an opinion -- you want us to write an opinion and say it's perfectly lawful under this statute, section (1), to knowingly deprive someone of a possessory interest by deception?

Koren L. Bell: Well, Your Honor, I think --

Justice Kennedy: You want us to write that?

Koren L. Bell: No, Your Honor. Insofar as first of all, the standard would be the intent, right? So we're talking about the -- the intent, which is different than knowledge --

Justice Kennedy: Intend to deprive someone by deception of a possessory interest is proper. You need something more. That's what you -- that's what you are saying?

Koren L. Bell: The intent to deceive the bank and deprive the bank of a possessory interest would Alderson Reporting Company 1 suffice. That does not come up in practice, however. The property --

Justice Ginsburg: Your point is you have to have the intent to the hurt the -- the bank --

Koren L. Bell: Exactly, Your -- exactly, Your Honor.

Justice Ginsburg: -- not the customer.

Koren L. Bell: That is exactly right.

Justice Ginsburg: So if you -- if the customer will end up bearing the loss, then you say one doesn't apply. What does one cover, in your view, other than check hiding?

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. It -- it applies to -- it applies to any scheme designed to cause the bank -- that -- that targets the bank as the financial victim of the fraud by means of concealment, omission, or any other kind of --

Justice Breyer: By watching the movies, most -- I'd be afraid, in this case, that we're going to write something of five pages that nobody's going to understand, with the simple thing, Jessie James goes up to the bank, says, your money or your life. He sees behind the teller is a drawer, and you know he's -- that in that drawer, the last five customers have given him Alderson Reporting Company 1 some money. That's the money he wants. It doesn't matter whether, in fact, the bank is going to put that money in Joe Smith's account, or whether the bank has something called a possessory interest or something else. And in fact, if Jessie James' brother comes up and says, Jessie James is on the way, give me the money, it should be the same result. Now that's very simple-minded, but -- and it's built in me by the movies, but if, in fact, you have a different approach, I would like to know where in the law that different approach is, and why it is, and -- and how this does -- how this is -- I'm afraid, in other words, of confusion. You unconfuse me, please.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor. And when Your -- when Your Honor says, if I have a different approach in terms of where our -- where our construction of clause (1) comes from in -- in the Court's precedents? Is that the question?

Justice Breyer: Well, my question is, why hasn't Jessie James or his brother committed a crime -- the brother, probably, because he's lied and says Jessie James is on the way, and whether the money behind the desk was put there, to everyone's knowledge, by the depositors, or whether the money happens to have been Alderson Reporting Company 1 there for 50 years by the bank -- put in by the bank's founder, makes no difference to this statute. And I want to know why it should, or anything else you want to say about that.

Koren L. Bell: So that case where there's some ambiguity, and this gets back to Your Honor's question, Justice Ginsburg, that case would be best charged under clause (2), which covers schemes that intend to victimize either the customer or the bank provided the requisite means of a false statement. So whenever there's any ambiguity in terms of what as a practical matter does this cover, clause (2) will cover the customer scheme in Loughrin -- I'm sorry, the altered-check scheme in Loughrin, and it will cover the deposit scheme here. It will cover Your Honor's hypothetical, provided the intent's also to deceive and it's not just plain, let's say, bank larceny which is covered under another statute and focuses on the effect of the conduct. And clause (1) then is reserved for other cases like check kiting, which was a major, major impetus for this statute's enactment, and Congress knew at the time, based on this Court's 1982 decision in Williams that check kiting was not going to be covered Alderson Reporting Company 1 under clause (2). It's one of the most pervasive forms of bank fraud. So that's not a minor role that clause (1) serves. But in addition, it's going to serve the loan fraud and the bank embezzlement types of cases no affirmative false statement.

Justice Sotomayor: All right. So if we disagree with you, if we were to say that this subsection 1 means that you are targeting property that -- depriving any bank of property in which it has a possessory interest --

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: -- and we say you don't have to prove the bank is going to lose anything of value, that it's going to be reimbursed by insurance or that ultimately the customer is going to receive -- bear the loss, so long as you have defrauded the bank, some deception to the bank, and deprived it of some possessory interest, whether it bears the loss or not, if that's how we rule, do you lose this case?

Koren L. Bell: No, Your Honor, because it comes down to the requisite intent and purpose.

Justice Sotomayor: We're disagreeing with you. That's how we're going to say what it means.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, I understand. And I -- Alderson Reporting Company

Justice Sotomayor: All right. Do you think --

Justice Kagan: Ms. Bell, I think your answer is, no, Your Honor, because the instructions don't reflect your understanding of the law.

Koren L. Bell: We certainly win on that basis. So reversal is required because the intent to defraud means more than just --

Justice Kagan: I'm not saying it does. I think it's a hard question as to whether the instructions do or don't, but it does seem to me you have an argument about the instructions.

Koren L. Bell: Right. That's -- that's correct, and I think we also, though, would not lose under that second question about even if the Court construes -- which we agree with -- but the intent must be to harm the bank and its property rights. It's the economic injury, and that is reflected in every single fraud decision we see from this Court starting with --

Justice Ginsburg: But if the Court disagrees with you about that, if the Court thinks that someone doesn't require that you intend to cause the bank financial harm, only that you intend to deprive the bank of something of value, if that's -- by deception --

Koren L. Bell: Yes. Alderson Reporting Company

Justice Ginsburg: -- should the Ninth Circuit be affirmed?

Koren L. Bell: No, but --

Justice Ginsburg: Should we reject your theory that you have to intend to cause the bank a financial loss?

Koren L. Bell: No, Your Honor, and let me be clear because I understand that it is confusing with the different theories, but our -- those two formulations that Your Honor articulated are one in the same in our view. In other words, the intent to wrong a bank in its property rights is the second component of defraud, but what does that mean in practice? That's not nonsensical for a jury. What that means is that the bank must bear the loss of the scheme. And so --

Justice Alito: That's not what it means.

Justice Breyer: You have a lot of cases, and I think the model penal code started it, where you have the word "intent" in a statute normally, not always, but normally it covers both purpose and knowledge. So that if you try to murder the queen by blowing up the carriage, a famous example, and that would lead to the death of the footman, even though you love the footman, you are still guilty of killing the Alderson Reporting Company 1 footman through murder. Okay. That's the famous example.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Breyer: So intent includes, unless there's some contrary which you could argue, to the both. The statute that can -- the instruction they have to show, scheme to defraud, means that the person intends, which means he has knowledge that, as I take it, to deceive, cheat or deprive. That's where the "or" is, deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value. So I looked at that and I thought, what's the problem? What's the problem? That's what I want you to explain.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Breyer: It's not saying intends to cheat or deceive somebody, and then a separate thing, or deprive the financial institution of value. It's intend to deceive, cheat or deprive. Who? A financial institution. Of what? Of something of value. So what is wrong with that instruction? That's -- that's what I need explanation.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor, and I'll answer that, and then if I may reserve the remainder of my time. Alderson Reporting Company 1 That -- the problem with that instruction is that it allows for a conviction on the basis of a scheme to deceive the bank alone. Now even if Your Honor disagrees with me, as it seems that you might, that problem is compounded by the intent to defraud instruction, which plainly it does not include the something of value reference. It plainly allows for a conviction on the basis of an intent to deceive alone. That flies in the face of this Court's fraud precedent, and we see this going from Hammerschmidt, in which the Court equated the idea of wronging a bank in its property rights, to pecuniary or property loss. We see it two years later in the Cone decision where the Court made it clear that an intent to take something from the United States, in that case the statute designated the United States, that that was insufficient to simply intend to take something from the United States custody without showing the intent to cause pecuniary and property loss. And we see that all the way through to Pasquantino, the 2005 decision about economic injury, through to Skilling, where the Court says traditional fraud involves the loss of property. So applying the meaning, the -- really the undisputed meaning of defraud, to the undisputed intent Alderson Reporting Company 1 to defraud element here, where clause (1) specifies the bank, that, Your Honor, is what is wrong with the instructions that allow for a conviction on the basis of a mere intent to deceive the bank. And if I may reserve the remainder of my time.

Chief Justice Roberts: Thank you, counsel. Mr. Yang. ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANTHONY A. YANG ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

Anthony A. Yang: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The intent required in this bank fraud scheme -- case is an intent to deceive the bank for the purpose of depriving it of something of value.

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, all right. Sorry to stop you so early on, but I did not understand that to be the argument in your brief. I'm looking at the heading C on page 36. Section 1344(1) requires proof of an intent to deceive a bank, not to cause it monetary loss. It -- so I didn't understand -- I'm not sure what -- when Justice Kagan proposed, asked, suggested she was going to ask you the question, I guess I a.m., I did not think -- I did not think you agreed with the Petitioner because I think the Alderson Reporting Company 1 Petitioner is saying very strongly intent to deceive is not enough. And I understand you to say that it is.

Anthony A. Yang: I'm sorry that the -- the heading was a little incomplete, but I think the rest of our brief, when you take it in context --

Chief Justice Roberts: What's missing?

Justice Kagan: Well, not just the heading, but analysis in that part C as well. I mean, the part C just seems to contradict part A or B or whichever it was.

Anthony A. Yang: What we were trying to --

Justice Kagan: If you really mean an intent to deceive is not enough, that you need something about to deprive the bank of its property interest.

Anthony A. Yang: Yes. And I think if you look, for instance, at page 14 and then at page 17 of footnote 1, at page 31 we say what's required is 1344(1), which is on page 14, reaches deceptive schemes designed to deprive the bank of property. Then on --

Chief Justice Roberts: What does the -- do they have to have the intent to deprive the bank of property?

Anthony A. Yang: Well, when you're designing -- when you're -- there's only one schemer here, right, so Alderson Reporting Company 1 the scheme is his scheme. And does the scheme have to deprive the bank of property? That's what the jury instructions --

Chief Justice Roberts: Okay. I just want to clear up that it is not enough to deceive a bank, right?

Anthony A. Yang: No, no, no, of course --

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, not of course, since that's what you said.

Anthony A. Yang: My apologies. I think, though, that when you take a look at the other parts of our briefs, and apology that we were trying to -- trying to distinguish --

Chief Justice Roberts: Okay.

Anthony A. Yang: -- between intent to harm from the intent to deceive, and we used some words that may have lead to confusion. That's not our position.

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, then if that's the case, then it all comes down to the instruction, deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value. Because you -- as I understand your position as clarified, you do have to have the intent to deprive a financial institution of something of value.

Anthony A. Yang: Right. Alderson Reporting Company

Chief Justice Roberts: Okay. Well, then it's all a question of whether "deceive" and "cheat" stand alone, or if they are also modified by "of something of value."

Anthony A. Yang: I think there's actually a deeper disagreement here, and I'm happy to talk about the jury instructions, and the jury instructions, of course, have to be read as a whole. And when you read that, and particularly in conjunction with the materiality requirement, which is discussed -- in a material matter, you have to deceive the -- defraud the bank as to a material matter, and a material matter is one that has a tendency that causes the bank to part with money or property -- I think when you read the instructions as a whole, there's really no problem with the instructions, but there's a really -- there is a deeper argument here. And that is the argument that Petitioner says that you have to intend to take something that you know is a property interest of the bank. You have to have knowledge of that. And I had thought until today that they were disputing whether a possessory interest was enough, but they've given that up.

Justice Kagan: Yes, so it seems to me, Mr. Yang, that the real disagreement that you have is that Ms. Bell wants to equate and intends to deprive a Alderson Reporting Company 1 bank of a property interest with an intent to have a bank suffer a pecuniary loss in the end. She says those are the same things. You say they're different things. Let's assume you're right. Let's assume that that's -- that whether the bank in the end suffers a monetary loss is utterly irrelevant to the form of intent that's required by this statute. All right? So you won that one, let's say.

Anthony A. Yang: Okay.

Justice Kagan: Go back to the Chief Justice's question about how these instructions reflect that there needs to be an intent to deprive the bank of a posessory interest in property.

Anthony A. Yang: I will go to those instructions, and I'm kind of happy to discuss them, but I don't think that's the end of the matter. I do think that there are actually two questions that are -- that Petitioner is trying to merge that are distinct. And they're actually --

Justice Kagan: I thought I was giving you them.

Anthony A. Yang: No, no. They're making two arguments. One --

Justice Kennedy: But could we talk about the instruction? I know -- Alderson Reporting Company

Anthony A. Yang: Yeah. Yeah, I just want to --

Justice Kennedy: -- that's the -- that's the last part of your argument. We want it first. Do you mind? Okay.

Anthony A. Yang: Not at all. I'm happy to discuss it. But in terms of the enduring legal consequence of this Court's decision, the bigger ones I'd like to get to. But I will discuss the instructions here.

Justice Kennedy: Well, we know there's a big picture in the world, but we want to know about the instructions first.

Anthony A. Yang: The instructions --

Chief Justice Roberts: The enduring consequence to Mr. Shaw is a little bit different, so --

Anthony A. Yang: Undoubtedly. But the Court generally doesn't take cases for error construction, and I want to -- and in the government's interest goes to the broader question of what does Section 1344(1) --

Justice Kagan: Say, Mr. Yang, the instructions.

Anthony A. Yang: So on the instructions -- this is at pages 17 through 19 of the joint appendix. And the first instruction that's relevant is the instruction that the defendant has to have knowingly executed a scheme to defraud -- that's a defined term -- a Alderson Reporting Company 1 financial institution as to a material matter. Now, we look -- if you turn the page to 18, the scheme to defraud is a scheme in which someone intends to deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value. Here there's only one schemer. So the schemer, the one that created the scheme, had to intend to deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value. Now, remember the first instruction that we discussed talks about -- has to be a scheme to defraud as to a material matter. If you go further down on page 18, a material matter is one that has the necessary tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the financial institution to part with money or property. This is what a scheme to defraud is. Now, I don't think when you take that in context, and you have to read instructions holistically, that there's really any question --

Justice Sotomayor: Don't forget instruction 21. You're cherry-picking.

Anthony A. Yang: Well --

Justice Sotomayor: An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive or cheat.

Anthony A. Yang: Right. And then we'll have to go Alderson Reporting Company 1 back to instruction 17 to see how that fits in. The second part is you also have to independently find that you did so; that is, execute the scheme to defraud that we discussed as to a material matter, with intent to defraud the financial institution. So their intent to defraud simply says you have to intend or deceive or cheat, again, the financial institution. That's somewhat superfluous in a single-person fraud scheme like this because you've already defined the scheme to embed those requirements.

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, but you've kind of -- instruction, you do read it in context, but if I read instruction 18 in the context of 21, it kind of highlights that you have deceive or cheat separate from the deprivation of something of value. So linguistically, you have to say that what they meant in the instructions was somebody who intends to deceive a financial institution of something of value. And that's just not grammatical.

Anthony A. Yang: It's not great, but it's not -- but it's not unacceptable here because --

Justice Breyer: It's okay once you put in the word "material" --

Anthony A. Yang: I think --

Justice Breyer: -- which is what you have Alderson Reporting Company 1 in instruction 17.

Anthony A. Yang: I think that's --

Justice Breyer: It says you have to execute a scheme or defraud a financial -- to defraud a financial institution as to a material fact. So that assumes it was separate.

Anthony A. Yang: No, no. But the material --

Justice Breyer: The deceive was separate. You would have to deceive the financial institution as to a material fact, which is defined in instruction 19 as one that has a natural tendency to influence a financial institution to part with money or property. So what you took away in instruction 21, you gave back in instruction 19. So it's a --

Chief Justice Roberts: And so in 18, sales deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value. "Something of value" goes right along with "deprive," but it doesn't go along with "deceive."

Anthony A. Yang: I don't think that's correct. I understand Your Honor's challenge here. It's that the -- you would say, like, out of something of value normally if you were saying it by itself. But when you have a series of verbs, it's not uncommon in -- in common parlance simply to use the appropriate, you know, Alderson Reporting Company 1 function word "hereof" with -- that connects to the last word. So when you say deceive, cheat or deprive a financial institution of something of value, the normal juror is going to understand that that means you're deceiving the financial institution, cheating the financial institution.

Chief Justice Roberts: Not if they -- not if they -- not if they read instruction 21, which talks -- has nothing to do with -- it just says intent to deceive or cheat, nothing of something of value. And when you quote the instruction on page 46 to make it read, to make it make sense, you have to add in, as you do, after deceive, deceive the bank out of something of value --

Anthony A. Yang: But I think --

Chief Justice Roberts: -- Because it makes no sense to say deceive of something of value.

Anthony A. Yang: It doesn't even parse under Petitioner's reading because I think Petitioner at least thinks that you have to deceive, cheat or deprive the financial institution -- like, deceive the financial institution.

Justice Kagan: They're kind of right. It doesn't -- it doesn't parse neatly under either reading. But I have to say that if I'm a reader, the way I Alderson Reporting Company 1 understand this is you have to -- you have to show -- the scheme has to be one to deceive a bank, to cheat a bank or to deprive a bank of something of value. And in that case, the "deceive a bank" is operating as a disjunctive clause without the "of something of value."

Anthony A. Yang: No, I think actually you could read --

Justice Kagan: It's to deceive a bank alone, cheat a bank alone, or deprive a bank of something of value. And so I'm a juror. I say, well, it's enough if the bank was deceived.

Anthony A. Yang: I don't see how you can read -- you might say just "deceive" in the abstract.

Justice Kagan: No, it's got to be that you're deceiving somebody.

Anthony A. Yang: Well, but if you're deceiving the bank, if a financial institution, which follows, connects to deceive, then so does "of something of value."

Justice Kagan: Well, I don't think so because that would make no sense. It would be the scheme must be one to deceive a bank of something of value. Whoever would use words like that?

Anthony A. Yang: I understand that it's a slightly -- there is a slight grammatical issue with Alderson Reporting Company 1 this language.

Justice Kagan: Well, I think it's more than grammatical. It's just -- like, it doesn't make sense.

Anthony A. Yang: I think when you read it in context, right, you have to take this -- this is the definition of scheme to defraud. When you read this in context with what you are -- the jury is required to do, knowingly executed a scheme to defraud a financial institution as to a material matter. Right? So that scheme has to be with regard to a material matter. That material matter has to lead the bank -- has a tendency to lead the bank to part with money or property. So when you take that in context, what does that mean? What's the material matter mean? The only way you can make sense is if you're actually depriving the bank of money or property. That is something of value. Now, if the Court has concerns about how this parses, the Court could decide the legal question, which is the important issue here, and simply --

Justice Sotomayor: Why has -- why has the government forgotten when it's at trial that simplifying things for juries is always the best thing? Do you really think that any juror reading this would parse it with the care that you are? Why can't you just say Alderson Reporting Company 1 something like a scheme to defraud a bank is a scheme to -- what was the three words? -- to deceive or cheat the money and to -- to cheat the bank of some interest in money or property?

Anthony A. Yang: I completely agree that simplicity is the -- is preferable. I don't think there's a problem with what we have here, but I will even one up you on the simplicity. I think the proper instruction is scheme to defraud is one to intended to deceive the bank for the purpose of depriving of it of something of value. Just get rid of the disjunctives, right? That would be the better -- the instruction for a single-member bank fraud scheme. Now, things get a little complicated when you have schemes with multiple members. We don't have to discuss it. It is discussed in footnote 10 of our brief. But for the purpose of this case, that would be simple. We think that the instructions, they're not perfect, but they're -- they -- they convey and the jury would have found the requisite requirements of bank fraud. And if the court has any doubts --

Justice Kennedy: Well, what is the -- what do we cite for that? Is there something in our cases that say that the instructions had to be read in the Alderson Reporting Company 1 context of what the jury heard or something like that?

Anthony A. Yang: I think the --

Justice Kennedy: I mean, we'd say close enough for government work.

Anthony A. Yang: I don't think we've quite said that, but I -- it's in pages 44 or 45 of our brief, which is the general proposition that you just have to -- that bank fraud -- excuse me -- that -- jury -- this is 46 -- jury instructions must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. And when you look at this in light of the materiality charge, any kind of ambiguity that might have been interjected in the definition of scheme to defraud I think is sufficiently displaced.

Chief Justice Roberts: It's just not the instruction. It's what the court of appeals held. The court of appeals held, in short -- this is a quote -- "The defendant was guilty of bank fraud because he intended to deceive the bank." Full stop. So it's not just a problem with the instructions. It's a problem with what the court of appeals held.

Anthony A. Yang: Again, I think this may be a problem with some brevity. I don't think the court of appeals meant to say if you walk into the bank and tell the bank, you know, the nationals lost their game and Alderson Reporting Company 1 don't have home field advantage that that's bank fraud. Of course, the court of appeals knows it's an order to obtain something from the bank. That's what bank fraud is. And I don't think that, you know, just as the heading for our brief in Section C might not have been fully complete, the same thing for the court of appeals opinion. But I'd like to get back to I think what's a broader issue here, which is what is the intent required. And particularly --

Justice Ginsburg: Just tell us: Why didn't -- why didn't the government charge under (2), which your colleague has agreed fits this case, that if he had been charged under (2) and convicted, that would be fine?

Anthony A. Yang: Because under (2), you need to actually prove a misrepresentation.

Justice Ginsburg: Because under (2) you have to prove --

Anthony A. Yang: You have to prove a false statement or false misrepresentation. Now, in the context of crimes that occur over the Internet, there's some complications that are involved with that. The charging decision was to take (1) -- clause (1) remember is scheme to defraud. This is the -- the mothership of Alderson Reporting Company 1 language from the fraud statutes. It comes from the mail fraud and the wire fraud. Congress knew that this was broad, and Congress intended to adopt it specifically because it was broad. And, in fact, Congress considered drafting language that would have required scheme to harm, cause economic loss to a financial institution, and specifically rejected it after the Department of Justice said, hey, that's too narrow. Scheme to defraud is broader, and this would unduly narrow the statute. So the government chose clause (1) because it was the broader clause, and we didn't need clause (2) which -- it could have complicated proof a little bit. Now, on the two questions that Petitioners presented, two kind of legal questions are, does the defendant have to have some knowledge of the legal property status of the thing that's being taken? I think the answer is clearly no. Willie Sutton in the 20th Century, to move off from Jessie James, he robbed banks because that's where the money is. Now, if Willie Sutton believed all the money he took was customer deposit accounts, didn't belong to the bank, he didn't ever intend to harm the bank, he'd still be -- you'd still call it bank robbery. And if he did the same thing through deceit, you'd call Alderson Reporting Company 1 it bank fraud. Now, there's no reason to add this additional intent knowledge about the property status of the thing that's being taken. It doesn't advance any interest that Congress is trying to advance is to protect the integrity of banks. The cost of the bank does not depend on what's subjectively in the defendant's mind, about what they think, is it owned by, is it ownership interest, is it a possessory interest, is there insurance, is there not insurance. It depends on the nature of the actual scheme and what's being taken. Congress would not have wanted to distinguish between defendants who execute the same -- the same scheme based on the idea that once defendant is sophisticated --

Justice Breyer: So what's the right words?

Anthony A. Yang: The right words?

Justice Breyer: For the -- I mean, there -- there are many situations. Do you -- you require an intent that there be property? Well, how do you want to say it, an intent to injure the bank in its property? How do you say it? Look, some people, bank robbers go into banks. They take the customers -- they line the customers up against the wall, and they take out their Alderson Reporting Company 1 billfolds. Is that defrauding the bank?

Anthony A. Yang: No, no. Because you're obtaining it from the customer.

Justice Breyer: Yeah, yeah. So how do you want to do this one?

Anthony A. Yang: So in bank fraud, the intent required -- and remember, there's more than just intent. As a fact we do have to prove there was a property interest to the bank. So, for instance, in your example --

Justice Breyer: There was, but it was a property interest in the bank. What do you have to prove in respect to that property interest is in the defendant's mind?

Anthony A. Yang: So the only intent required is the intent to deceive the financial institution in order to obtain something of value. Now, that something of value --

Justice Breyer: In order to obtain something of value, so that it could be of value and belong only to the customer?

Anthony A. Yang: That -- that complicates things I think in the --

Justice Breyer: Yes. That's why I want to know -- that's why I need to know the words. Alderson Reporting Company

Anthony A. Yang: There's no more required for intent. Now, in order to --

Justice Kagan: I quoted you it was, that it's an -- it's an intent to deprive the bank of a property, including a possessory interest.

Anthony A. Yang: No. And the reason it's something of value that in fact is a possessory interest. Whether or not -- or a property interest. Whether or not the defendant knows it's a property --

Justice Kagan: Yes. But the bank -- the bank has to have a possessory interest in -- a property interest in this thing.

Anthony A. Yang: Right. And property interest is broad. But the defendant doesn't have to know about that property interest. It just has to know I'm trying to get money, that I want the money, and that's enough. Now, the money happens to, in fact, be a property interest to the bank, but the defendant doesn't have to know that. We don't require our defendants to have taken property law or banking law or studied the risk of loss rules when frauds occur to banks. None of these things have to be in the knowledge or of -- or beliefs.

Justice Kennedy: What does he have to know about? Does he have to know that the bank is involved? I mean, what does he have to know about the bank? Alderson Reporting Company

Anthony A. Yang: He has to know that he --

Justice Kennedy: That the bank is likely involved? I mean, this is pretty easy because he sent a check, but --

Anthony A. Yang: Well, no, I think what's required is -- and let me take a step back. When we're talking -- we're talking about financial institutions, and it might help to refer to page 1A of the government's appendix. Financial institutions are not just banks. Financial institutions include certain banks when they are FDIC insured, certain credit unions, and then a whole slew with ten -- a list of ten other things. It includes a small business investment company --

Justice Kennedy: Okay. But here we have a bank. What did this defendant have to know about this bank, if anything?

Anthony A. Yang: It didn't have to know its status as a bank under the statute. It just had to know it's taking something from this entity, which in fact, again, is a bank under the statute. It could be a holding company. It could be -- it could be any of these things. If taking something from this entity by deceit, and that's the intent, right? Something of value from this entity by deceit. It doesn't have to know does Alderson Reporting Company 1 this entity -- is it a small business investment company defined under Section 103 of the Small Business Investment Act? It doesn't have to know these things. And the reason is once you get into the realm of fraudulently taking something from an entity, it -- that's criminal conduct. And the additional requirements that it is a bank, that's the jurisdictional hook. It's similar to --

Justice Kennedy: It has to know that a financial institution is involved?

Anthony A. Yang: It doesn't have to --

Justice Kennedy: I mean, that's Section 1.

Anthony A. Yang: It doesn't have -- it has to -- it doesn't have to have any knowledge about whether the entity that it's depriving of property qualifies as a financial institution. It could be, for instance, a small kiosk in a grocery store that's conducting transactions and happens actually to be a bank outpost, but you don't know it's a bank. But you rob a bank or you -- you defraud the bank, it's still -- you don't have to have knowledge of its status as a financial institution. There are several examples. Bank robbery or larceny, under Section 2113(a) and (b), the courts held you don't need to know that the entity robbed is a bank. Alderson Reporting Company 1 That's Trevino in the Fifth Circuit, Schaar in the Seventh Circuit. Theft of U.S. property -- if you steal U.S. property, you don't have to know it's owned by the U.S. There's a recent case called Rehak in the Eighth Circuit that surveys the unanimous views that you don't have to have knowledge of the status as property of the United States.

Justice Ginsburg: And can you clarify for us, what is in the overlap area? What is covered only by (1) and what is covered only by (2)?

Anthony A. Yang: They are, of course, cover almost -- they are almost coterminous, but there are things that are outside of (1), and there are things that are outside of (2). What's outside of (1) are schemes that -- schemes where you do not -- fraud is not targeted at the bank or -- yes, so (2) -- let me -- let me start over. It's a little confusing. (2) is broader than (1) in the following respect: It covers --

Justice Ginsburg: (2) covers what?

Anthony A. Yang: (2) -- clause (2) is broader than (1) because it covers schemes to deceive the custodian of bank property. (1) does not because the deception has to be directed at the bank. But (1) covers things that (2) does not, because (2) is limited only to false Alderson Reporting Company 1 statements. This is what Loughrin explained in a footnote. (1) covers frauds that are based on nonstatement-type deception; for instance, check hiding. Checks are not statements about the balance in the account. Check training is covered. Other behavioral type of frauds. If, for instance -- it's a little farfetched, but you could have someone that impose -- that, you know, dresses in a disguise and just walks into the bank. The bank lets them into the -- it's a well-known customer, walks in the safety deposit box, takes out the money. No statement's made. (1) would cover that kind of thing. Now, these areas are, you know, on the fringe. The two terms, the two provisions largely overlap, and that's not surprising because the language that was the impetus for two was language that the Court adopted in Durland in construing the term "scheme to defraud." So there's a lot of overlap between these two things, and that's what Justice Kagan recognized in Loughrin. But they both have independent meaning, not a lot, and so, you know, they often can be used at the same time, but they are independent.

Justice Kagan: Mr. Yang, you referred to us, money in a security deposit. Your answer would be Alderson Reporting Company 1 the same, right --

Anthony A. Yang: Yes.

Justice Kagan: -- if -- if somebody went in and said, I'd like to see the security deposit boxes, and -- and made a false statement to the bank about his entitlement to see the security deposit boxes and took the money out?

Anthony A. Yang: Yes.

Justice Kagan: Doesn't -- you know, the bank still has a possessory interest in that, even though it doesn't use that money in the same way; is that correct?

Anthony A. Yang: Correct.

Justice Kagan: Let me give you another example. Suppose that I'm sitting in a coffee shop and somebody comes up to me and says, I have to make a phone call; would you just hang on to my computer for a minute? And then disappears, and then somebody else comes up, the fraudster comes up, and says, oh, she just told me to pick up her computer from her --

Anthony A. Yang: Uh-huh.

Justice Kagan: -- and that's a misrepresentation.

Anthony A. Yang: Uh-huh.

Justice Kagan: But I give him the computer. Alderson Reporting Company

Anthony A. Yang: Uh-huh.

Justice Kagan: Do I -- have I had a possessory interest in that computer just because somebody said, why don't you take a look, you know -- you know -- keep -- keep your eye on this?

Anthony A. Yang: Gratuitous bailee is what they would be. And I think the answer is -- I think we would say yes for purposes of the -- the fraud statute. Now this wouldn't, of course, be bank fraud. And --

Justice Kagan: Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean --

Anthony A. Yang: But -- but --

Justice Kagan: What you're essentially saying is that anything I can think of, any hypothetical I can think of which involves my hanging on to something for somebody else, that I have a possessory interest in that sufficient to satisfy this scheme.

Anthony A. Yang: Yeah. And I don't -- it's sufficient for this purposes. And I don't think this is unusual. Oftentimes, rights and interest in the law are relative to other people. So your possessory interest would not be superior to the person who owned the laptop. But it would be superior as to third parties having no claim of right -- no valid claim of right to Alderson Reporting Company 1 the laptop. So yes, that, I think, could fall within the general understanding of a scheme to defraud. Obviously, not a scheme to defraud a financial institution.

Justice Kagan: I mean, that suggests to me that as long as the person knows that the money is being -- is in the bank somehow, it just shouldn't matter, because anything counts as a possessory interest, right?

Anthony A. Yang: It shouldn't -- it shouldn't matter at all. And I think that emphasizes why Congress would not have wanted to add some additional knowledge requirement about the property status of the money. Why does it matter? All it does is complicate things. Congress would not have wanted to carve out this type of conduct as noncriminal. And in fact, it's important to recognize, even Petitioner says she's not -- he's not carving out anything that's not noncriminal. In page 25 of the reply brief, Petitioner says it's a -- essentially, a pleading game. Well, why would Congress have wanted to make the broad language of scheme to defraud, which has a history going back more than a century, to be a narrow appendage on something Alderson Reporting Company 1 else in order to force the government into a pleading game, when no -- at the end of the day, if it's pled properly, it's still an offense punished by the same time. It just doesn't make any sense. This is not what Congress intended. It has no -- no basis in the text or history of the bank fraud. When you look at what Congress did in the legislative history, it rejected language that would have adopted the same thing. As far as I can tell, everything points against Petitioner here. If the court has no further questions. We'd ask that you affirm.

Chief Justice Roberts: Thank you, counsel. Ms. Bell, you have three minutes remaining. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KOREN L. BELL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Koren L. Bell: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. To get back to Justice Breyer's question about where in the record was this disputed, that -- that is at pages 646 to 647. And there, counsel -- myself -- specifically made the argument that the problem with this -- this instruction, exactly as Justice Sotomayor, and I believe Justice Kagan, pointed out, is the disjunctive wording of intent, the intent to defraud. Alderson Reporting Company

Justice Sotomayor: Counselor, assume I agree with you --

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Sotomayor: -- that there were parts of your argument, both below and here in your brief, that suggested the instructional error. But what I find is that the way you presented the argument was confusing.

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: It took a lot of teasing out. Does -- how does that affect what we do.

Koren L. Bell: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Sotomayor: That -- that you weren't clear in the instruction, don't you forfeit that argument?

Koren L. Bell: No, Your Honor. The -- the claim is that the intent to -- we challenge --

Justice Sotomayor: I -- I know what your two claims are.

Koren L. Bell: Okay.

Justice Sotomayor: The question is if I disagree --

Koren L. Bell: Yes.

Justice Sotomayor: -- with your basic Alderson Reporting Company 1 premise that you need to prove pecuniary loss to the bank -- I know you want to win that, but please accept my hypothetical. I disagree with you that the only -- that the only issue is that you have to cheat and deprive the bank of a possessory -- of something in a possessory -- in their possessory interest. Okay? Simple as that. It doesn't have to cause -- you don't have to intend to cause pecuniary loss. All right? Where does that leave your instructional error?

Koren L. Bell: It's -- it's still an error, Your Honor, because it permitted a conviction on the basis of the mere intent to deceive the bank. And there's no curing it, looking to, for example, the materiality component of the instruction, how --

Justice Sotomayor: How about if I find that what you -- that you didn't articulate your argument clearly enough to the court below, or to us? Where does that put you? Have you forfeited? Do you waive? Have you done something?

Koren L. Bell: No, Your Honor. The -- the challenge was always to the disjunctively-worded jury instruction. And that was consistently made from the district court to the court of appeals and to this Court. The only question has been how to formulate; if Alderson Reporting Company 1 more than intent to deceive is required, then what more? How do we explain that second component? Hammerschmidt itself, which is the undisputed applicable definition here, uses a number of different formulations, and that's part of where the confusion comes from. Hammerschmidt says the intent to defraud is the intent to deceive, and it also uses the -- and to wrong a bank in its property rights. It equates to wrong a bank in its property rights with to deprive a -- I'm sorry -- a victim. It equates to wrong a victim in its property rights with depriving a victim of something of value, and it also equates that with cheating a victim out of something of property, and also. To make matters even more confusing in terms of the number of formulations, it says that the mail fraud statute is limited to the infliction of pecuniary or property loss. And so our formulations come out of the Hammerschmidt case. And what we have always asked the Court to do here is to construe intent to defraud to require, not just the intent to deceive, as the lower court instructions required, but also the intent to do that second thing, which is --

Chief Justice Roberts: Thank you, counsel. Alderson Reporting Company

Koren L. Bell: Thank you.

Chief Justice Roberts: Case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.) 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Alderson Reporting Company OOffffiicciiaall -- SSuubbjjeecctt ttoo FFiinnaall RReevviieeww A ambiguity 22:6 articulate 56:17 30:2,5 31:11 beliefs 46:22 22:11 41:12 articulated 31:13,19 32:1 believe 54:23 a.m 1:14 3:2 5:5 analysis 29:8 25:10 32:2,5,12 believed 6:1 5:23 28:24 Angeles 1:17 asked 17:2 37:13 38:2,3,3 43:21 58:3 anomalous 8:20 28:23 57:20 38:4,8,9,9,11 believes 4:15,17 above-entitled answer 8:21 asking 5:21,22 38:17,22 39:11 4:21 1:12 58:4 24:4 26:23 assets 11:11 39:12,16 40:1 Bell 1:16 2:3,9 Absolutely 9:7 43:18 50:25 Assistant 1:18 40:3,10,13,21 3:5,6,8 4:6,17 abstract 7:5 52:7 assume 32:4,4 41:8,18,19,24 4:23 5:11,15 38:13 ANTHONY 55:1 41:25 42:1,3,3 6:5,11 7:21 accept 56:2 1:18 2:6 28:9 assumes 36:6 43:23,24,24 8:19 9:7,19,25 account 11:11 apologies 30:10 avoids 8:2 44:1,6,22,23 10:4,11,14,23 11:13 15:1 apology 30:12 45:1,6,9,12 11:4,8,16 12:4 21:3 50:5 B appeals 41:16 46:4,10,11,18 12:8,18,21 accounts 43:22 41:17,21,24 b 29:9 48:24 46:24,25 47:2 13:1,4,7,15 acquisition 42:2,6 56:24 back 4:10 7:17 47:16,17,19,21 14:2,7,18,21 18:21 APPEARAN... 7:23 22:6 48:7,18,19,19 14:24 15:5,10 Act 48:3 1:15 32:10 35:1 48:20,23,25 15:14,19,22 actual 44:11 appendage 36:14 42:8 49:16,23,24 16:1,5,13,24 add 37:12 44:2 53:25 47:6 53:24 50:9,9 51:5,10 17:3,10,16,25 53:13 appendix 33:22 54:18 52:9 53:8 54:6 18:4,17 19:14 addition 23:4 47:9 backed 17:13 56:2,5,13 57:9 19:16,24 20:5 additional 44:3 applicable 57:4 bailee 8:13 52:6 57:10 20:8,14 21:15 48:6 53:13 applies 20:15,15 bailor 8:14 bank's 3:18 7:9 22:5 23:12,21 adopt 43:3 apply 20:11 balance 50:4 19:5 22:1 23:25 24:3,6 adopted 50:17 applying 27:24 bank 3:10,15,16 bank-held 3:19 24:13,25 25:3 54:8 approach 21:10 3:17,20 4:18 banking 46:20 25:7 26:3,15 advance 44:4,5 21:11,17 6:16,20 7:16 banks 10:6 26:23 31:25 advantage 42:1 approaches 7:17,19 8:4,11 43:20 44:6,24 54:14,15,17 affect 6:16 55:12 18:24 8:11,13,14,23 46:21 47:10,11 55:3,9,13,17 affirm 54:12 appropriate 9:8 9:9,21,21 based 3:13 6:22 55:21,24 56:11 affirmative 23:6 36:25 10:12,22,25 9:10 22:24 56:21 58:1 affirmed 25:2 approved 11:19 11:10,14 12:13 44:15 50:2 belong 43:23 afraid 20:20 area 49:9 13:10 15:2,2,7 basic 55:25 45:21 21:12 areas 50:13 16:21,22 17:9 basis 11:20 best 22:7 39:23 agree 11:3,6,24 argue 26:5 17:22 18:7,16 12:23 24:6 better 40:12 24:16 40:5 arguing 13:6 18:25 19:5,24 27:2,8 28:3 big 33:10 55:2 argument 1:13 19:25 20:4,16 54:6 56:12 bigger 33:7 agreed 28:25 2:2,5,8 3:3,6 20:16,23 21:2 bear 3:20 4:4,19 billfolds 45:1 42:13 6:21 7:15 14:1 21:4 22:1,9,18 8:6 16:2 18:8 bit 33:14 43:13 agrees 17:21 14:3,6 24:12 23:2,5,10,14 23:16 25:16 blowing 25:23 Alito 14:16 18:9 28:9,18 31:16 23:17,18 24:17 bearing 20:10 blue 13:18 18:12 25:17 31:17 33:3 24:23,24 25:5 bears 23:19 body 17:21 allow 28:3 54:15,21 55:5 25:12,16 27:3 behalf 1:17,20 box 50:11 allows 27:2,8 55:7,16 56:17 27:12 28:2,4 2:4,7,10 3:7 boxes 51:4,6 altered-check arguments 28:13,14,21 28:10 54:16 brevity 41:23 22:14 32:23 29:14,19,22 behavioral 50:6 Breyer 4:14,20 AAllddeerrssoonn RReeppoorrttiinngg CCoommppaannyy 4:25 5:13,21 30:19 38:4 50:3,5 57:19 confusing 25:8 6:6 12:15,20 40:18 42:13 Checks 50:4 comes 4:9 5:22 49:17 55:8 12:24 13:2,5 49:4 57:19 cherry-picking 13:18 16:9 57:16 13:13,16,21,25 58:2,3 34:21 17:19 21:6,18 confusion 17:18 14:4 17:1 cases 22:22 23:5 Chief 3:3,8 7:4 23:21 30:19 21:13 30:17 20:19 21:20 25:18 33:16 8:9 28:7,11,16 43:1 51:16,19 57:6 25:18 26:4,16 40:24 29:6,21 30:4,8 51:19 57:6 Congress 9:10 35:22,25 36:3 cause 3:20 16:1 30:14,18 31:1 committed 22:23 43:2,3,5 36:8 44:17,19 17:17 18:7,14 32:10 33:13 21:21 44:5,13 53:12 45:4,11,19,24 20:15 24:22 35:11 36:15 common 36:25 53:16,23 54:5 Breyer's 54:18 25:5 27:20 37:7,16 41:15 commonly 7:15 54:7 brief 17:8 28:18 28:21 43:6 54:13,17 57:25 company 47:14 conjunction 29:5 40:17 56:7,8 58:2 47:22 48:1 31:9 41:6 42:5 causes 31:13 chose 43:11 complains 8:3 connects 37:1 53:21 55:5 causing 18:16 Circuit 11:19 complete 42:6 38:18 briefs 30:12 century 3:14 25:2 49:1,2,5 completely 40:5 consequence broad 43:3,4 43:19 53:25 circuits 9:12 complicate 33:6,14 46:14 53:23 certain 47:10,11 18:24 53:15 considered 43:5 broader 33:18 certainly 7:2 cite 40:24 complicated consistently 42:9 43:10,12 10:7 14:24 claim 17:13 40:14 43:13 56:23 49:18,21 17:18 18:4 52:25,25 55:17 complicates constitute 7:2 brother 21:6,21 24:6 claims 55:20 45:22 construction 21:22 certainty 9:25 clarified 30:23 complications 21:17 33:16 built 21:9 challenge 36:21 clarify 49:8 42:23 construe 57:21 business 47:13 55:18 56:22 classic 11:3 component construes 24:15 48:1,2 chance 14:5 clause 3:10,13 25:13 56:15 construing charge 9:8 41:10 6:18,19 8:23 57:2 50:17 C 41:11 42:12 9:12,12,20 components context 29:5 C 2:1 3:1 28:19 charged 9:2,4 21:18 22:8,13 5:19 16:8 34:18 35:12,13 29:8,8 42:5 22:7 42:14 22:21 23:1,3 compounded 39:5,7,13 41:1 Cal 1:17 charges 3:24 28:1 38:5 27:5 41:10 42:22 call 43:24,25 charging 42:24 42:24 43:11,12 computer 51:17 contradict 29:9 51:17 cheat 12:16,25 43:12 49:21 51:20,25 52:3 contrary 26:5 called 21:4 49:4 13:2,12,14 cleaner 5:6,24 concealment control 9:3 capable 34:14 14:14 15:2,3,7 clear 3:15 9:20 20:17 convey 40:20 care 19:8 39:25 15:17,19 26:9 14:9 25:8 concede 9:1 convicted 9:2 carriage 25:23 26:10,17,19 27:15 30:5 concept 15:20 16:20 42:14 carve 53:16 30:20 31:2 55:15 concepts 7:5 conviction 11:20 carving 53:19 34:4,8,24 35:7 clearly 43:18 concerns 3:12 12:23 27:2,8 case 3:4,12 5:12 35:14 36:16 56:18 39:18 28:3 56:12 5:15 6:13 7:13 37:2,10,20 close 41:3 conduct 22:20 correct 7:8 7:23 9:8,14 38:2,9 40:2,3 code 25:19 48:6 53:17 10:23 11:4,8 10:5 12:8 56:4 coffee 51:15 conducting 12:1,18 13:1,4 16:10 17:7 cheating 15:12 coffers 10:13 48:17 13:15 15:14,18 18:23 20:20 37:5 57:14 colleague 14:15 Cone 27:14 15:23 16:23 22:5,7 23:20 check 20:13 42:13 confused 10:16 17:15 24:13 27:16 28:14 22:22,25 47:4 come 5:19 20:1 17:5 36:20 51:12,13 Alderson Reporting Company Correctly 18:4 custodian 49:22 deception 15:25 53:24 54:25 9:16 cost 44:6 custody 9:3 16:1,15,16,18 57:7,21 designated coterminous 27:19 19:13,21 23:18 defrauded 23:17 27:17 49:12 customer 3:20 24:24 49:23 defrauding 9:5 designed 20:15 counsel 28:7 6:20 18:8 19:3 50:3 15:21,22 45:1 29:19 54:13,20 57:25 19:6 20:7,10 deceptive 29:18 defrauds 5:4,4 designing 29:24 Counselor 55:1 22:9,13 23:16 decide 39:19 Department desk 21:24 counts 53:9 43:22 45:3,21 decision 22:24 1:19 43:8 devising 8:8 course 7:17 10:5 50:10 24:19 27:15,21 depend 4:23 difference 10:17 30:7,8 31:7 customer's 19:4 33:7 42:24 5:11 44:7 22:2 42:2 49:11 customers 20:25 deeper 31:5,16 depending 9:13 different 16:4,6 52:9 44:24,25 defendant 4:15 depends 6:21 17:17 19:19 court 1:1,13 3:9 4:17 7:14,18 44:10 21:10,11,16 D 4:11 7:23 14:1 8:7 18:22 deposit 22:15 25:9 32:3 18:18 24:15,19 D 3:1 33:24 41:18 43:22 50:11,25 33:14 57:5 24:20,21 27:11 D.C 1:9,19 43:16 44:15 51:4,6 direct 6:24 27:15,22 28:12 day 54:2 46:9,14,18 depositor's directed 49:24 33:15 39:18,19 dear 5:23 47:16 11:11,13 disagree 11:25 40:22 41:16,17 death 25:24 defendant's 4:7 depositors 21:25 13:8 23:8 41:21,23 42:2 deceit 43:25 44:8 45:14 deposits 19:3 55:23 56:3 42:6 50:16 47:23,25 defendants 19:2 deprivation disagreeing 54:11 56:18,24 deceive 3:16 44:14 46:19 16:16 17:8 23:23 56:24,25 57:20 10:21 11:18 Defender 1:16 18:19 35:15 disagreement 57:22 12:10,12,16,25 defense 8:10,18 deprive 4:8 31:6,24 Court's 3:14 13:3,12,14 define 6:23 10:25 11:14 disagrees 24:21 4:10 6:22 13:9 14:14,23 15:17 defined 33:25 12:16,25 13:3 27:4 14:8 17:20 19:24 22:17 35:10 36:10 13:10,14,17 disappears 21:18 22:24 26:9,10,17,19 48:2 15:11,17 18:14 51:18 27:10 33:7 27:3,9 28:4,14 definition 39:6 18:25 19:12,20 disavow 18:5 courts 48:24 28:20 29:1,13 41:13 57:4 19:25 24:23 discuss 32:15 cover 20:12 30:5,16,20 defraud 3:11,15 26:9,10,18,19 33:5,8 40:16 22:12,13,15,16 31:2,11 34:4,8 4:12,25 5:12 29:14,19,22 discussed 31:10 49:11 50:12 34:24 35:7,14 5:14,15,19 30:2,20,23 34:11 35:4 covered 22:18 35:18 36:8,9 6:12,14,16,23 31:25 32:12 40:16 22:25 49:9,10 36:16,19 37:2 11:19 12:11 34:4,8 36:16 discussions 17:5 50:5 37:10,13,13,17 13:9 14:10,11 36:18 37:2,20 disguise 50:9 covers 22:8 37:20,21 38:2 14:13 15:24 38:3,9 46:4 disjunctive 25:21 49:19,20 38:4,8,13,18 16:7,8,14 24:7 56:5 57:10 12:22 16:20 49:22,24 50:2 38:22 40:2,10 25:14 26:7 deprived 10:12 38:5 54:24 created 34:7 41:19 45:16 27:6,25 28:1 10:13 16:22 disjunctively-... credit 47:11 49:22 56:13 31:11 33:25 23:18 56:22 crime 21:21 57:1,8,22 34:3,11,16,23 depriving 18:15 disjunctives crimes 42:22 deceived 15:1 35:3,5,6 36:4,4 23:10 28:15 40:11 criminal 3:24 16:22 38:11 39:6,8 40:1,9 39:15 40:10 displaced 41:14 6:8 48:6 deceiving 15:12 41:13 42:25 48:15 57:13 dispute 10:7 culpability 3:11 16:21 37:5 43:9 48:20 Deputy 1:16 16:9 curing 56:14 38:15,16 50:18 53:3,4 design 9:13,14 disputed 54:19 Alderson Reporting Company disputing 31:21 57:14 false 7:3 15:1 footnote 29:17 game 41:25 distinct 32:18 error 33:16 55:6 22:10 23:6 40:16 50:2 53:22 54:2 distinguish 56:10,11 42:20,21 49:25 force 54:1 general 1:19 30:13 44:14 ESQ 1:16,18 2:3 51:5 forfeit 55:15 41:7 53:3 district 56:24 2:6,9 famous 25:23 forfeited 56:19 generally 33:16 door 5:1,23 essentially 52:14 26:1 forget 8:14 getting 7:6 doubts 40:22 53:22 far 5:2 16:11 34:20 15:16 18:21 drafting 43:5 EUGENE 1:3 54:9 forgotten 39:22 Ginsburg 8:25 drawer 20:24,25 evening 6:2 farfetched 50:7 form 10:25 32:6 20:3,7,9 22:7 dresses 50:8 everybody 17:21 FDIC 47:11 forms 23:1 24:20 25:1,4 Durland 7:23 everyone's federal 1:16 formulate 56:25 42:11,18 49:8 50:17 21:24 3:10 9:11 formulation 49:20 exactly 9:9 18:24 17:17 give 5:24 7:17 E 16:24,25 20:5 field 42:1 formulations 21:7 51:14,25 E 2:1 3:1,1 20:5,8 54:22 Fifth 49:1 25:9 57:5,16 given 20:25 early 28:17 example 6:15,25 fighting 11:7 57:19 31:22 easy 47:3 9:15 10:6 financial 3:11 found 9:6 40:21 giving 32:20 economic 24:17 25:23 26:2 9:3,5 12:17 founder 22:2 go 5:2 7:7 32:10 27:22 43:7 45:10 51:15 13:22 20:17 fraud 3:10,14,21 32:14 34:12,25 effect 8:16 22:19 56:14 24:23 25:6 4:10 5:7,16,17 36:18 44:23 effect-based 8:2 examples 48:23 26:10,18,19 5:25 6:9,13,22 goes 12:24 20:22 Eighth 49:4 excuse 41:8 30:20,24 34:1 7:1 8:22,24 9:9 33:17 36:17 either 8:13 19:3 execute 35:3 34:4,8,15 35:5 17:20,20 20:17 going 4:4,10 19:4 22:9 36:3 44:14 35:7,18 36:4,5 23:2,5 24:18 7:23 8:5 9:15 37:24 executed 33:24 36:9,12,16 27:10,23 28:13 11:5 19:6,6 element 3:12 39:8 37:3,5,6,21,21 35:9 40:13,22 20:20,21 21:3 14:12 16:6,14 explain 6:10 38:17 39:8 41:8,18 42:1,3 22:25 23:4,14 28:1 12:9 17:17 43:7 45:16 43:1,2,2 44:1 23:15,16,24 elements 16:4,6 18:17 26:14 47:7,9,10 45:6 49:15 27:10 28:23 else's 7:9 57:2 48:10,16,21 52:8,9 54:6 37:4 53:24 embed 35:10 explained 50:1 53:4 57:17 good 5:10 embezzlement explanation find 16:21 35:2 frauds 46:21 government 4:7 23:5 26:22 55:6 56:16 50:2,6 5:18 8:3 9:4 emphasizes extensively fine 42:15 fraudster 51:19 11:24 16:9 53:12 14:16 first 6:8,23 7:21 fraudulently 39:22 41:4 enactment 22:23 eye 52:5 11:17 13:7 48:5 42:12 43:11 enduring 33:6 17:7 19:16 friend 5:10 6:2 54:1 33:13 F 33:3,11,23 fringe 50:14 government's entails 3:13 face 27:9 34:10 Full 41:19 10:18 33:17 entitlement 51:6 fact 5:8 8:4,6,12 fits 35:1 42:13 fully 42:6 47:9 entity 10:3 10:4,13 21:2,5 five 20:21,25 function 37:1 grammatical 47:20,23,25 21:9 36:5,10 flies 27:9 funds 10:12 35:19 38:25 48:1,5,15,25 43:5 45:8 46:7 focuses 22:19 further 34:12 39:3 equate 31:25 46:17 47:20 following 49:18 54:11 Gratuitous 52:6 equated 7:24 53:17 follows 38:17 great 35:20 27:11 fair 12:2 footman 25:24 G grocery 48:17 equates 57:9,12 fall 53:2 25:25 26:1 G 3:1 guess 10:14,15 Alderson Reporting Company 28:24 11:16 12:18 influencing insufficient 45:7,15,16 guilty 9:6 25:25 13:4,7,15 14:2 34:14 27:18 46:2,4 47:24 41:18 14:7,18 15:19 injure 44:22 insurance 7:7 54:24,24 55:18 15:23 16:24 injury 24:18 23:15 44:10,10 56:13 57:1,7,8 H 17:16 19:14,16 27:22 insured 4:14,15 57:21,22,23 Hammerschm... 20:6,14 21:15 insofar 10:11 4:18,21,22 5:7 intent's 22:17 16:10 27:11 21:16 23:21 19:5,16 5:8 6:3 7:6 intent-based 57:3,7,19 24:4 25:7,10 instance 29:16 47:11 8:21 9:10 hang 51:17 26:3,15,23 45:9 48:16 insurer 6:12 8:5 interest 8:5,12 hanging 52:16 27:4 28:2 55:3 50:3,7 integrity 44:6 8:13,15 9:18 happen 6:16 55:13,17 56:12 institution 3:12 intend 12:12 9:24 10:2,2,10 happens 21:25 56:21 9:4,5 12:17 18:19,22 19:20 11:1,10,15 46:17 48:18 Honor's 22:6,16 13:22 26:10,18 22:8 24:22,23 13:5 16:17,23 happy 31:6 36:21 26:20 30:20,24 25:5 26:18 17:12,15 18:14 32:15 33:5 hook 7:20 48:8 34:1,5,8,15 27:18 31:18 18:15 19:1,12 hard 24:10 hundred 4:11 35:5,8,18 36:5 34:7 35:7 19:21,25 21:5 harm 9:17,21 hurt 20:4 36:9,12,16 43:23 56:8 23:11,19 29:14 10:2,3,10 hypothetical 37:3,5,6,21,22 intended 6:19 31:19,21 32:1 24:16,23 30:15 22:16 52:15 38:17 39:9 9:10 18:21 32:13 33:17 43:6,23 56:3 43:7 45:16 40:9 41:19 40:3 44:5,9,9 harmed 10:2,5 48:10,16,22 43:3 54:5 45:9,12,13 harmony 12:7 I 53:5 intends 7:23 8:7 46:5,8,8,11,12 heading 28:19 idea 18:22 27:11 institutions 47:7 13:21 26:8,16 46:13,15,18 29:3,7 42:5 44:15 47:9,10 31:25 34:4 51:10 52:3,17 hear 3:3 ignorance 8:10 instruction 35:17 52:21,22 53:10 heard 41:1 8:17,20 13:10 14:13 intent 3:11,15 56:6 heightened 6:15 image 18:20 26:6,21 27:1,6 3:16,17,19 4:7 interests 11:2,2 held 41:16,17,21 impetus 22:23 30:19 32:25 4:8 5:12 9:15 11:3 18:3 48:24 50:16 33:23,23 34:10 9:17,19 10:21 interjected help 47:8 important 39:20 34:20 35:1,12 10:25 11:14,18 41:12 hereof 37:1 53:18 35:13 36:1,10 11:18 12:10,11 Internet 42:22 hey 43:9 impose 50:8 36:13,14 37:8 12:16 14:10,13 interpretation hide 15:4 include 18:3,3 37:11 40:9,12 14:14,16,20 13:9 hiding 20:13 27:7 47:10 41:16 54:22 16:7 17:22 interpreted 4:11 50:3 includes 3:18 55:15 56:15,23 18:7,25 19:17 investment highlights 35:14 11:2 26:4 instructional 19:18,24 20:4 47:13 48:1,3 history 53:24 47:13 55:6 56:9 23:22 24:7,16 involved 42:23 54:6,8 including 11:15 instructions 25:12,20 26:4 46:24 47:3 holding 3:23 46:5 11:20,25 12:3 27:6,9,15,19 48:10 15:3 47:21 incomplete 29:4 12:16 24:4,11 27:25 28:4,13 involves 27:23 holistically independent 24:12 28:3 28:14,20 29:1 52:16 34:18 50:21,23 30:3 31:7,7,14 29:12,22 30:15 irrelevant 32:6 home 42:1 independently 31:15 32:11,14 30:16,23 32:1 issue 3:24 14:16 Honor 4:6 6:11 35:2 33:8,11,12,20 32:6,12 34:23 18:5 38:25 6:25 7:21 8:7 infliction 57:18 33:21 34:18 34:24 35:4,6 39:20 42:9 8:19 9:7,19 influence 34:14 35:17 40:19,25 37:9 42:9 44:3 56:4 10:8,11 11:4,8 36:11 41:9,20 57:23 44:21,22 45:6 issues 11:17 Alderson Reporting Company J 26:4,16 28:7 5:23 42:2 46:9 53:7 49:17 50:7 28:11,16,22 Kardashian's KOREN 1:16 loan 23:4 James 20:22 29:6,7,12,21 4:20 2:3,9 3:6 54:15 loaned 5:9 6:2 21:6,21,23 30:4,8,14,18 keep 7:6 52:5,5 7:17 43:20 L 31:1,23 32:10 Kennedy 9:16 loans 7:10,11 James' 21:6 32:20,24 33:2 9:23 10:1,9,15 L 1:16 2:3,9 3:6 local 5:5,22,24 Jessie 20:22 33:9,13,19 17:24 19:9,15 54:15 long 23:17 53:7 21:5,6,21,22 34:20,23 35:11 19:20 32:24 lack 16:15 long-standing 43:20 35:22,25 36:3 33:2,9 40:23 language 4:24 6:22 jewelry 4:21 5:5 36:8,15 37:7 41:3 46:23 39:1 43:1,6 look 10:21 11:10 5:5,6,9,24,24 37:16,23 38:8 47:2,15 48:9 50:15,16 53:23 29:15 30:11 6:1 38:14,20 39:2 48:12 54:8 34:2 41:10 Joe 21:3 39:21 40:23 killing 25:25 laptop 52:24 44:23 52:4 joint 33:22 41:3,15 42:11 kind 20:18 53:1 54:7 juries 39:23 42:18 43:8 32:15 35:12,13 larceny 3:24 looked 26:12 jurisdictional 44:17,19 45:4 37:23 41:11 22:18 48:24 looking 28:19 48:8 45:11,19,24 43:15 50:12 largely 50:14 56:14 juror 37:4 38:10 46:3,10,23 kiosk 48:17 law 6:8,8 8:10 Los 1:16 39:24 47:2,15 48:9 kiting 22:22,25 8:11,17,20 lose 4:3 6:3 jury 11:19 16:20 48:12 49:8,20 knew 22:23 43:2 12:1,6 17:22 23:14,20 24:14 25:15 30:2 50:19,24 51:3 knocking 5:1 21:11 24:5 loss 3:21 4:4,4,5 31:6,7 39:7 51:9,14,22,25 know 5:1 11:12 46:20,20 52:21 4:19 8:6 10:6 40:20 41:1,8,9 52:2,11,14 11:23 20:24 lawful 9:17 16:2 18:8,14 56:22 53:6 54:13,17 21:10 22:3 19:11 18:16 19:6,7 Justice 1:19 3:3 54:18,23,23 31:19 32:25 LAWRENCE 20:10 23:17,19 3:8,22 4:14,20 55:1,4,10,14 33:9,10 36:25 1:3 25:6,16 27:13 4:25 5:13,21 55:19,22,25 41:25 42:4 lead 25:24 30:17 27:20,23 28:21 6:6 7:4 8:9,25 56:16 57:25 45:25,25 46:14 39:11,12 32:2,5 43:7 9:16,23 10:1,9 58:2 46:15,19,23,24 leave 56:9 46:21 56:1,8 10:14,15,24 Justice's 32:11 46:25 47:1,16 legal 8:16 33:6 57:18 11:5,9,22 12:5 47:18,19,25 39:19 43:15,16 lost 4:12 41:25 12:15,20,24 K 48:3,9,19,25 legislative 54:7 lot 25:18 50:18 13:2,5,13,16 Kagan 10:14,24 49:3 50:8,13 let's 22:18 32:4 50:22 55:10 13:20,21,24,25 11:5,9,22 12:5 50:22 51:9 32:4,8 Loughrin 22:13 14:4,15,15,19 13:20,24 15:16 52:4,5 55:19 liability 8:2,21 22:14 50:1,20 14:22,25 15:6 17:12 18:2,11 56:2 9:10 love 25:25 15:11,15,16,21 19:8 24:3,9 knowingly lied 5:1 21:22 lower 57:22 15:24 16:3,11 28:22 29:7,12 19:12 33:24 life 20:23 16:14 17:1,1,4 31:23 32:10,20 39:8 light 41:11 M 17:11,12,24 33:19 37:23 knowledge limited 49:25 mail 5:16 6:13 18:2,9,11,12 38:8,14,20 14:17 19:19 57:17 17:20 43:2 19:8,9,15,20 39:2 46:3,10 21:24 25:22 line 44:24 57:17 20:3,7,9,19 50:19,24 51:3 26:8 31:20 linguistically major 22:22,22 21:20 22:7 51:9,14,22,25 43:16 44:3 35:16 making 7:10 23:7,13,23 52:2,11,14 46:22 48:14,21 list 47:12 8:10 32:22 24:1,3,9,20 53:6 54:23 49:6 53:13 little 29:4 33:14 manifesting 25:1,4,17,18 Kardashian knows 7:14,22 40:14 43:13 11:14 Alderson Reporting Company material 31:10 minutes 54:14 necklace 5:10 omission 20:18 particular 6:18 31:12,12 34:1 mired 7:5 need 19:22 once 35:22 8:2,22 14:5 34:12,13 35:4 mirror 18:20 26:22 29:13 44:15 48:4 particularly 35:23 36:5,7 misrepresenta... 42:16 43:12 ones 33:7 31:9 42:10 36:10 39:9,10 42:17,21 51:23 45:25 48:25 open 15:1 parties 52:24 39:11,14 missing 29:6 56:1 operating 38:4 parts 30:11 55:4 materiality 31:9 model 25:19 needs 10:21,24 operative 17:2 party 4:18 41:11 56:14 modified 31:3 32:12 17:21 Pasquantino matter 1:12 8:4 modify 13:11 never 10:6 18:5 opinion 19:10 27:21 21:2 22:12 momentary 18:23 19:10 42:7 pecuniary 27:12 31:10,12,12 10:12 Ninth 11:19 opposed 17:11 27:20 32:2 32:16 34:1,12 monetary 28:21 25:1 oral 1:12 2:2,5 56:1,8 57:18 34:13 35:4 32:5 nobody's 20:21 3:6 28:9 penal 25:19 39:9,10,11,14 money 5:4 6:3 noncriminal order 16:1 42:2 penalize 6:14 53:9,12,15 7:3,11,16,16 53:17,20 45:16,19 46:2 penalties 6:15 58:4 8:16 15:4 nonsensical 54:1 people 7:15 matters 8:6 16:17 19:4,5 25:15 outpost 48:18 44:23 52:22 57:15 20:23 21:1,1,3 nonstatement-... outside 49:13,14 perfect 12:6 mean 4:12 5:3 21:7,23,25 50:3 49:14 40:20 7:14 17:14 31:13 34:15 normal 37:3 overall 41:10 perfectly 16:11 18:6,17,18 36:12 39:12,16 normally 25:20 overlap 49:9 19:11 25:14 29:8,12 40:3,4 43:21 25:21 36:23 50:15,18 period 10:12 39:14,14 41:3 43:22 46:16,16 notice 10:19 owned 9:3 17:9 permits 12:22 44:19 46:25 46:17 50:11,25 number 57:4,16 17:14 44:8 permitted 11:20 47:3 48:12 51:7,11 53:7 49:3 52:23 56:12 O 52:12 53:6 53:14 ownership 11:3 person 5:22 26:7 meaning 3:13 mothership O 2:1 3:1 18:14 44:9 52:23 53:7 27:24,25 50:21 42:25 object 6:24 7:1 personal 18:23 means 3:19,23 move 43:19 obtain 7:3 42:3 P pervasive 23:1 4:3 7:3 12:13 movies 20:19 45:17,19 P 3:1 Petitioner 1:4,17 13:14,23 18:7 21:9 obtaining 9:2 page 2:2 14:4,5 2:4,10 3:7 18:10,12 20:17 moving 15:8 45:2 28:19 29:16,16 28:25 29:1 22:10 23:9,24 multiple 40:15 Obviously 53:4 29:17,18 34:2 31:17 32:17 24:8 25:15,17 murder 25:22 occasion 5:10 34:13 37:11 37:19 53:18,21 26:7,8 37:4 26:1 occur 42:22 47:8 53:21 54:10,16 meant 18:5 46:21 pages 20:21 Petitioner's 35:17 41:24 N October 1:10 33:22 41:6 37:19 members 40:15 N 2:1,1 3:1 offense 54:3 54:20 Petitioners mentioned 8:25 name 15:1 Oftentimes parlance 36:25 43:14 mere 28:4 56:13 narrow 43:9,10 52:21 parse 37:18,24 phone 51:16 merely 4:5 16:21 53:25 oh 51:19 39:24 pick 51:20 17:14 nationals 41:25 okay 6:4 7:8 parses 39:19 picture 33:10 merge 32:18 natural 36:11 13:25 15:5,9 part 11:11 29:8 piece 12:12 mind 33:4 44:8 nature 44:11 26:1 30:4,14 29:8,9 31:13 plain 22:18 45:14 neatly 9:12 31:1 32:9 33:4 33:3 34:15 plainly 27:6,8 minor 23:3 37:24 35:22 47:15 35:2 36:12 plan 7:25 minute 51:18 necessary 34:13 55:21 56:6 39:12 57:5 plausibly 13:11 Alderson Reporting Company pleading 53:22 pretenses 7:3 56:1 39:4,6 40:25 require 24:22 54:1 pretty 47:3 provide 6:15 reader 37:25 44:20 46:19 please 3:9 5:24 probably 21:22 provided 5:18 reading 17:8 57:21 21:14 28:12 problem 12:20 22:9,17 37:19,24 39:24 required 5:12 56:2 26:13,13 27:1 provisions 50:14 real 31:24 5:17 7:1 9:19 pled 54:2 27:5 31:15 Public 1:16 real-world 9:15 14:14 18:13 point 10:7 11:23 40:7 41:20,20 publicity 6:4 really 7:18 24:7 28:13 16:12 20:3 41:23 54:22 punished 8:22 11:25 14:11 29:17 32:7 pointed 54:23 prong 12:10 54:3 27:24 29:12 39:7 42:10 points 54:9 16:16 purpose 7:24 31:15,16 34:19 43:6 45:7,15 posessory 32:13 prongs 16:15 8:1,8 23:22 39:24 46:1 47:5 57:1 posit 19:2 proof 28:20 25:21 28:15 realm 48:5 57:23 posited 6:25 43:13 40:10,18 reason 8:1 9:8 requirement position 30:17 proper 3:20 purposes 52:8 44:2 46:6 48:4 31:10 53:14 30:22 19:21 40:8 52:20 rebuttal 2:8 requirements possessory 3:19 properly 54:3 put 7:15 21:3,24 14:8 54:15 35:10 40:21 3:22,25 4:2,5,8 property 3:17 22:1 35:22 receive 23:16 48:7 8:5 9:17,23 3:18,19 4:1,12 56:19 recognition 11:1 requires 3:16 10:1,10 11:2 7:3,5,7,9,10,11 putting 10:19 recognize 9:1 12:10,11 14:10 11:10,15 13:5 8:12,13,15,17 53:18 28:20 Q 16:17,22 17:12 9:2,22 10:25 recognized requisite 22:10 17:14 18:3,15 11:1,15 12:14 qualifies 48:15 18:19 50:19 23:22 40:21 19:1,12,21,25 14:23 15:12,18 queen 25:22 record 54:19 reserve 26:24 21:4 23:11,19 16:2 17:22,25 question 6:6 refer 47:8 28:5 31:21 44:9 18:1,1,8 20:2 8:17 10:20 reference 27:7 reserved 22:21 46:5,7,11 23:9,10 24:17 17:2 21:19,20 referred 50:24 respect 45:13 51:10 52:3,17 25:13 27:12,13 22:6 24:10,15 reflect 9:15 24:5 49:19 52:22 53:9 27:20,23 29:14 28:24 31:2 32:11 respectfully 56:5,6,6 29:19,23 30:2 32:11 33:18 reflected 12:1 13:8 practical 9:14 31:14,19 32:1 34:19 39:19 24:18 Respondent 1:7 22:12 32:13 34:15 54:18 55:22 regard 39:10 rest 29:4 practice 18:6,6 36:12 39:12,16 56:25 regardless 3:25 result 21:7 18:23 20:1 40:4 43:17 questions 32:17 Rehak 49:4 reversal 24:7 25:14 44:3,21,22 43:14,15 54:11 reimbursed rid 40:11 precedent 3:14 45:8,12,13 quite 9:20 41:5 23:15 right 3:23,25 4:2 3:15 4:10 6:23 46:5,8,9,11,13 quote 37:11 reject 25:4 4:5,8 6:5 7:14 17:20,21 27:10 46:15,17,20 41:17 rejected 43:8 9:22 11:16,22 precedents 48:15 49:2,3,6 quoted 46:3 54:8 11:24 14:19,22 21:19 49:23 53:14 relative 52:22 14:23,25 15:4 R precisely 8:1 57:9,10,12,15 relevant 33:23 15:13,15 16:24 R 3:1 14:3 57:18 remainder 16:25 19:17 rates 7:7 preferable 40:6 proposed 28:23 26:24 28:5 20:8 23:7 24:1 reaches 29:18 premise 56:1 proposition 41:7 remaining 54:14 24:13 28:16 read 13:11 31:8 premises 3:11 protect 44:6 remember 34:10 29:25 30:6,25 31:8,14 34:18 presence 6:24 prove 4:7 5:18 42:24 45:7 32:4,7 34:25 35:12,13 37:8 presented 43:15 23:14 42:17,19 repeat 5:22 36:17 37:23 37:12 38:7,12 55:7 42:20 45:8,13 reply 53:21 39:5,9 40:12 Alderson Reporting Company 44:17,18 46:13 21:22 27:23 51:4,6 Solicitor 1:18 status 43:17 47:24 51:1 31:18 32:2 seeks 13:17 somebody 7:9 44:3 47:18 52:25,25 53:10 35:6 36:3 37:9 seen 18:23 26:17 35:17 48:21 49:6 56:8 51:16,19 53:18 sees 20:23 38:15 51:3,16 53:14 rightly 17:12 53:22 57:7,17 sense 3:21 7:24 51:18 52:4,17 statute 3:10 4:6 rights 3:17,18 Schaar 49:1 18:18 37:12,17 somewhat 35:8 4:24 5:12,13 3:19 7:5 12:14 scheme 3:21 38:21 39:3,15 sophisticated 6:7,17,18 8:23 17:23,25 18:1 5:17 6:12,12 54:4 44:16 9:9 19:11 22:2 18:1 24:17 6:14 7:1,2,25 sent 47:3 sorry 3:22 12:11 22:19 25:20 25:13 27:12 8:2,8,21,22 separate 26:17 16:5 22:14 26:6 27:17 52:21 57:9,10 9:11,13 13:9 35:14 36:6,8 28:17 29:3 32:7 43:10 57:13 14:10 18:8 series 36:24 57:11 47:19,21 52:8 risk 46:20 20:15 22:13,14 serve 23:4 sort 9:12 57:17 rob 15:13 48:19 22:15 25:16 serves 23:4 Sotomayor 3:22 statute's 22:23 robbed 43:20 26:7 27:2 settled 3:13 4:10 14:15,19,22,25 statutes 5:16 48:25 28:14 30:1,1,1 Seventh 49:2 15:6,11,15,21 6:14 43:1 robbers 44:23 33:25 34:3,3,7 Shaw 1:3 3:4 9:1 15:24 16:3,11 steal 49:2 robbery 43:24 34:11,16 35:3 9:6 33:14 16:14 17:1,4 step 4:2 47:6 48:23 35:9,10 36:4 shop 51:15 17:11 23:7,13 steps 6:22 ROBERTS 3:3 38:2,22 39:6,8 short 41:17 23:23 24:1 stolen 7:7 7:4 8:9 28:7,16 39:10 40:1,1,9 show 26:7 38:1 34:20,23 39:21 stop 28:17 41:19 29:6,21 30:4,8 40:13 41:13 showing 27:19 54:23 55:1,4 store 48:17 30:14,18 31:1 42:25 43:6,9 similar 48:8 55:10,14,19,22 strongly 29:1 33:13 35:11 44:11,15 50:17 simple 20:22 55:25 56:16 studied 46:20 36:15 37:7,16 52:18 53:3,4 40:19 56:7 specifically 43:4 sub 8:25 41:15 54:13 53:24 simple-minded 43:8 54:21 subjectively 57:25 58:2 schemer 29:25 21:8 specified 6:18 44:7 role 23:3 34:6,7 simplicity 40:6,8 specifies 9:21 submitted 58:2 rule 23:20 schemes 6:15 simplifying 28:1 58:4 rules 46:21 9:11 19:3 22:8 39:22 specify 5:17 subsection 23:9 29:18 40:15 simply 14:13 stand 31:3 suffer 19:6,7 S 49:15,15,22 27:18 35:6 standard 7:22 32:2 S 2:1 3:1 school 6:8 36:25 39:20 17:19 19:17 suffered 10:6 safety 50:11 second 6:24 12:9 single 24:18 start 49:17 suffers 32:5 sales 36:15 12:12 24:15 single-member started 25:19 suffice 20:1 satisfy 6:17 25:13 35:2 40:13 starting 24:19 sufficient 4:9 52:18 57:2,24 single-person statement 22:10 11:18 52:18,20 saying 10:21 section 19:11 35:9 23:6 42:21 sufficiently 16:19 17:14 28:20 33:18 sitting 51:15 51:5 41:13 19:23 24:9 42:5 48:2,12 situations 44:20 statement's suggested 28:23 26:16 29:1 48:24 Skilling 27:22 50:12 55:6 36:23 52:15 security 50:25 slew 47:12 statements 50:1 suggesting 10:15 says 4:25 5:1,5 51:4,6 slight 38:25 50:4 suggests 53:6 5:13,23 6:19 see 4:13 5:2 slightly 38:25 States 1:1,6,13 superfluous 8:7 12:15 17:16 24:19 small 47:13 48:1 1:20 2:7 3:4 35:8 13:19 17:12 27:10,14,20 48:2,17 27:16,17,19 superior 52:23 20:23 21:6,16 35:1 38:12 Smith's 21:3 28:10 49:7 52:24 Alderson Reporting Company Suppose 51:15 57:16 thought 6:7 uncommon 47:24 57:13 Supreme 1:1,13 text 3:13 54:6 15:16 17:7 36:24 verbs 36:24 sure 14:7 28:22 Thank 3:8 16:13 26:12 31:20 unconfuse 21:14 versus 14:17 surprising 50:15 28:7 54:13,17 32:20 understand victim 4:12 5:17 surveys 49:5 57:25 58:1 three 40:2 54:14 11:16 16:12 6:18,19 18:19 Sutton 43:19,21 theft 4:16,22 time 14:8 22:24 17:18 20:22 20:17 57:11,12 synonymous 49:2 26:25 28:6 23:25 25:8 57:13,14 15:20 theories 25:9 50:23 54:4 28:17,22 29:2 victimize 22:9 theory 25:5 today 31:20 30:22 36:21 view 10:17,18 T thief 4:20 told 51:20 37:4 38:1,24 20:12 25:11 T 2:1,1 thing 8:6 10:16 traditional understanding viewed 41:9 take 7:19 14:8 20:22 26:17 27:23 12:1,6 24:5 views 49:5 15:8 26:8 39:23 42:6 training 50:5 53:3 27:16,18 29:5 43:17,25 44:4 transactions undisputed 5:19 W 30:11 31:18 46:12 50:12 48:18 14:11 27:25,25 waive 56:19 33:16 34:17 54:9 57:24 Trevino 49:1 57:4 walk 41:24 39:5,13 42:24 things 13:7 32:3 trial 39:22 Undoubtedly walks 50:9,10 44:24,25 47:6 32:3 39:23 tried 6:1 33:15 wall 44:25 52:4 40:14 45:22 triple 5:8 6:3 unduly 43:10 want 3:25 5:2 taken 4:1 7:12 46:22 47:13,23 true 10:8 unions 47:11 7:19 11:23 15:7 43:17 48:3 49:13,13 try 25:22 United 1:1,6,13 14:8 19:9,10 44:4,12 46:20 49:24 50:19 trying 29:11 1:20 2:7 3:4 19:15 22:3,3 takes 50:11 53:15 30:12,12 32:18 27:16,17,19 26:13 30:4 talk 12:2 31:6 think 5:6 7:15 44:5 46:15 28:10 49:7 33:1,3,10,17 32:24 11:5,17 12:9 Tuesday 1:10 unusual 52:21 44:21 45:5,24 talking 7:25 13:10,13,20,22 turn 7:13 34:2 use 7:10 36:25 46:16 56:2 19:18 47:7,7 15:19 19:2,14 turns 4:6 38:23 51:11 wanted 5:25 talks 34:11 37:9 24:2,3,10,14 two 5:18 6:22 uses 8:15 57:4,8 44:13 53:13,16 target 11:12,13 25:19 28:24,25 7:20 11:17 utterly 32:6 53:23 targeted 49:16 28:25 29:4,15 13:7 16:4,5,6,8 wants 15:3 21:1 targeting 23:9 30:10 31:5,14 16:15 25:9 V 31:25 targets 20:16 32:15,16 34:17 27:14 32:17,22 v 1:5 3:4 Washington 1:9 teasing 55:10 35:24 36:2,20 43:14,15 50:14 valid 52:25 1:19 technicalities 37:15,19 38:6 50:14,16,18 value 4:3 12:17 wasn't 7:8,8 8:3 38:20 39:2,4 55:20 13:3,6,11,22 watching 20:19 tell 11:6 41:24 39:24 40:6,8 type 50:6 53:17 15:6 23:15 way 15:7 21:7 42:11 54:9 40:19 41:2,5 types 23:5 24:24 26:11,18 21:23 27:21 teller 20:24 41:13,22,23 26:20 27:7 37:25 39:15 ten 47:12,12 42:4,8 43:18 U 28:15 30:21,24 51:11 55:7 tendency 31:13 44:8 45:23 U.S 49:2,3,4 31:4 34:5,9 we'll 3:3 34:25 34:14 36:11 47:5 52:7,7,15 Uh-huh 51:21 35:15,19 36:17 we're 7:25 14:9 39:11 52:16,20 53:2 51:24 52:1 36:17,22 37:3 18:21 19:18 term 4:11 5:19 53:12 ultimately 4:4 37:10,14,17 20:20 23:23,24 33:25 50:17 thinks 5:7,8 23:16 38:3,5,10,19 47:6,7 terms 12:10 7:18 8:11 unacceptable 38:23 39:17 we've 41:5 21:17 22:11 24:21 37:20 35:21 40:11 45:17,18 well-known 33:6 50:14 third 52:24 unanimous 49:5 45:20,20 46:7 50:10 Alderson Reporting Company went 51:3 33:5,12,15,19 17 29:16 33:22 9 weren't 55:14 33:21 34:22,25 35:1 36:1 whichever 29:9 35:20,24 36:2 18 34:2,13 35:13 wife 15:3 36:7,20 37:15 36:15 Williams 22:25 37:18 38:6,12 1896 7:24 Willie 43:19,21 38:16,24 39:4 19 33:22 36:10 win 24:6 56:2 40:5 41:2,5,22 36:14 wire 5:16 6:13 42:16,20 44:18 1982 22:24 17:20 43:2 45:2,6,15,22 1A 47:8 won 32:7 46:1,6,13 47:1 word 25:20 47:5,18 48:11 35:23 37:1,2 48:13 49:11,21 2 8:23,25 9:12 worded 12:21 50:24 51:2,8 22:8,13 23:1 wording 54:24 51:13,21,24 42:12,14,16,18 words 12:22 52:1,6,13,19 43:12 49:10,14 13:13 21:13 53:11 49:16,18,20,21 25:12 30:16 yeah 33:1,1 45:4 49:21,25,25 38:23 40:2 45:4 52:11,11 2005 27:21 44:17,18 45:25 52:11,19 2016 1:10 work 41:4 year 6:8 20th 43:19 works 9:9 years 4:11 22:1 21 34:21 35:13 world 33:10 27:14 36:13 37:8 worth 6:4 2113(a) 48:24 wouldn't 5:6 Z 25 53:21 8:19 52:9 28 2:7 write 19:9,10,15 20:21 3 2:4 written 14:16 3:10 6:18,19 31 29:17 wrong 3:16,17 9:12,20 19:11 36 28:19 6:9 7:20 8:16 21:18 22:21 12:13 17:22 23:3,9 28:1 4 25:12 26:21 29:17 42:24,24 4 1:10 28:2 57:9,10 43:11 48:12 44 41:6 57:12 49:10,13,14,18 45 41:6 wronging 27:12 49:22,23,24 46 37:11 41:9 50:2,12 X 1)'s 3:13 x 1:2,8 40:16 50 22:1 Y 10:57 1:14 3:2 54 2:10 Yang 1:18 2:6 103 48:2 10:19 11:6,6,9 11:51 58:3 646 54:20 28:8,9,11 29:3 1344(1) 28:20 647 54:20 29:11,15,24 29:18 33:18 30:7,10,15,25 14 29:16,18 7 31:5,24 32:9 15-5991 1:4 32:14,22 33:1 15991 3:4 8 Alderson Reporting Company